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AB TRACT 
Defining Predatory Mortgage Lending in Utah: 
A Pro fess ional Perspecti ve 
by 
Luke V. Eri ckson, Master of Science 
Utah State Uni vers ity, 2006 
Major Professor: Dr. Lucy Delgad illo 
Department: Family, Consumer, and Human Development 
The purpose of thi s study was to defin e and desc ribe the nature o f predatory 
mortgage lending in the state of Utah . Twelve profess ionals from the state who wo rk in 
the mo rtgage lending market parti cipated. Data consisted of interviewee eom ments and 
were analyzed qualitati ve ly usi ng a mult i-step method of coding for concepts and themes. 
Through coding and analys is it was determined that the term predatory mortgage 
lend ing is defin ed as an act of abuse that is targeted towards a borrower with one or more 
vulnerable characterist ics. It was al so fo und that users of this term do not always adhere 
to thi s stri ct definition, but rather use it as a catch-a ll term fo r any general mortgage 
ab use, rather than on ly for those that are targe ted. The term is al so used when referring 
to instances of fraud , and nearl y all other forms of unfair lending. 
To help increase the measurability of predatory lending, the interviews also gave 
desc ripti ve detai l in terms of it s magnitude, underl ying factors, commonl y occurring 
practi ces, victim charac teri sti cs, impacts, and suggestions for reduct ion . Suggesti ons for 
iv 
reduc ti on of predatory lending include increas ing accountability of actors, both legally 
and by the industry it se ll~ bridging state and national jurisd ictional gaps, and increasing 
funding for co nsumer education and neighborhood revitali zation. Education was 
espec iall y emphasized as a too l fo r preventing occ urrences of predatory mortgage 
lending. not only in the form ofprc-homebuyer education but espec iall y in the fo rm of 
financial ed ucation as a requirement in the public schools, beginning at a very yo ung age. 
( 134 pages) 
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CHAPTER I 
TRODUCTIO 
Problem Statement 
The Mortgage Bankers Associati on estimated that $2.5 trillion in mortgage loans 
wou ld be made during 2005 (Federal Bureau of In vest igation , 2005). Because o f their 
sheer size, the mot1gage lending and the housing markets have a significant impact on the 
nation's overa ll economy (Federal Bureau of Investi gation). With nearly 70% of 
Ameri cans owning homes and the majorit y o f those spending between 25-50% o f their 
incomes on ho using, it is easy to sec why the market is so vast (Colton, 2003). 
In an effort by the federal govern ment to improve affordab ilit y, the mort gage 
lending market has been deregulated over the last seve ral decades (Engel & McCoy, 
2002). Because of increased freedom to lend without government imposed caps on 
interest rates and fees , and the ab il it y to trade bund les of securiti zed loans on the market 
and to quick ly estimate a borrower's cred it risk , lenders have become far more wi lli ng 
than in the past to lend large amounts of money to very risky bo1Towers (Engel & 
McCoy). Thus nearly anyone can secure a loan at some price (Engel & McCoy). This 
ri skier sec tion of the mortgage lending market has been labeled subprime lending. 
The subp rime lending market has ex isted for decades, but it ex ploded in the earl y 
I 990s, growing from an estimated 535 billion in 1994 to $220 billion in 2002 (Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago, 2003; Lord, 2005; U.S. Department of Housing, 2000). From 
I 993 to I 998 the numbers of loans made by lenders speciali zing in subprime loans grew 
nearl y I 0 times from I 04,000 to 997,000 (Lord; U.S. Department of Housing). 
Securiti zation ofsubprime loans grew from Sl l billion in 1994to $203 billion in 2003; 
th e nearly 20-fold increase demonstrating a continued and widespread acceptance of 
in vestment in high ri sk loans (Lord). 
Not all of the g rowth has been positi ve, however. Between th e yea rs 1990 to 
1998 foreclosures grew 384% (U.S. Census Bureau, 1999). In 1993, subprime lending 
and serv ices accounted for 1.4% of the forec losu res, but in 1998. 35.7% of forec losu res 
were subprime and thi s percentage is ex pec ted to increase (National Training and 
In formation Center, 1999). The news head lines also became riddl ed with accounts of 
un ethi cal and unsc rupulous lenders who were making profits at th e expense of 
unsuspectin g borrowers; an epidemi c dubbed "predatory lend ing" (McCoy & Wyly, 
2004). 
According to McCoy and Wyly (2004 ), from 1992 to 1999 the average number of 
art ic les in major U.S. newspapers with "predatory" and "mortgage" in the head line, lead 
paragraph, or subject terms, was about 20 per year, while the average number of articles 
fitting the same criteria from 2000-2003 was rou ghl y 200 per year, or ten times hi gher. 
Us ing conservative figures, Stein (2001) estimated that direct annual losses to U.S. 
consumers from predatory lending practi ces were at a minimum, $9. 1 billion. Thi s 
conserva tive fig ure does not inc lude any losses to individ uals or neighborhoods because 
of excessive foreclosures , nor does it inc lude the more subt le predatory lend ing practices, 
wh ich are ever increasing (Stein). 
According to a H UD/Treasury joi nt report (U.S. Department of Housing, 2000}, 
these types of loans do indeed increase foreclosure rates, and increase the financial 
burdens of homeowners, which often resu lts in th ei r bankruptcy (Sullivan , Warren , & 
Westbrook, 2000). By their very nature, predatory loans decrease the fin anc ial stability 
of a househo ld; bleeding already vulnerab le households of their low-incomes and savi ngs 
(Cordy, 2003; Special Committee on Aging, 2004). Differences between legitimate 
subprime and predatory loans can be sli ght , but have significant consequences (U .S . 
Department o[ Housing). An adequate separation between legitimate subprime lending 
and ill egi timate predatory lending is necessary in order to reduce the losses to financiall y 
vulnerab le households. 
Need for Study 
The 1-1 UD/Treasury report (U.S. Department of Housi ng, 2000) conveyed the idea 
that defin ing predatory mortgage lending is a prob lematic task because bad actors 1 are 
con tantl y developing new and abusive lending practi ces, often with a specifi c intent to 
avo id new government regulations (U . ·. Department of Housing). Additionally, 
preda tory lend ing cannot be con lined to a li st of unethical actions on the part of the 
lender because predatory loans are al so func ti ons of how and to whom they are made. 
For example, a prepayment penalty may be ethical in a case in which a borrower agrees 
to it s terms in order to reduce hi s interest rate; however, a lender who includes a 
prepayment penalty without the knowledge or consent of the borrower, and does not 
provide a bene fit in return such as a reduced interest rate, is unethical. Another reason 
that li sts of predatory acts are insufficient is because a loan can often be legi timate while 
containing one of the named acts, but on ly when that act is combined with another act or 
1 The term "bad actor" was used by the U.S. Department of Treasury (2000) and other litt.:rature to describe 
all perp~:trators in bad loans. not just lenders. This could include appraisers, brokers. loan omcers, rl!a l 
estalt' agems. and any other party thnt acts as a perpetra tor of predatory lending actions. 
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circumstance is the loan truly predatory (U.S. Department of Housing). In an effort to 
produce an encompassing definition, the 2000 H UD/Treasury joint report defined 
predatory lending as follows: 
[Predatory lending] involves engaging in deception or fraud , manipu lating the 
bo rrower through aggress ive sales tac ti cs, or taking unfair advantage of a 
borrower 's lack of understandi ng about loan terms. These practi ces are often 
comb ined with loan terms that , alone or in combination, are abusive or make the 
borrower more vu lnerable to abusive practices. (p. l) 
While thi s definition is encompass ing, its generality allows for little 
enforceability. Who is to dec ide when deception, manipulation, aggression and unfai r 
sa les tacti cs occur, and by what standards'l Again. thi s definition has only led to a need 
lor further de finiti ons before effecti ve steps can be made. It should be no surpri se that 
most attempts to add ress and regulate predato ry lendi ng have been rebutted wi th the 
argument that no one can agree upon a clear and concise defi ni tion (Engel & McCoy, 
2002). 
Opponents of predatory lending reform argue that because the problem is not 
clea rl y definab le, a clear so lution is neither needed nor achievable. Advocates of reform 
argue that , "because you know it when yo u see it ," something shou ld obviousl y be done. 
The Tru th in Lending Act (TlLA) was one fed era l attempt to add ress unfair lend ing 
issues (Engel & McCoy, 2002). Th is leg islati on requires lenders to clea rly di sc lose 
~ 
fin ance charges, the principle amount borrowed, the total interest to be paid over the life 
of the loan, and the Annual Percentage Rate (A PR)2 (Lord, 2005). TILA also allows a 
borrower of a home equity loan, or a refinanci ng, three days to cancel the loan wi thout 
1 Annual Percentage Rate {APR) is defined as the "Ann ual cost of credit over the life of a loan, 
inc luding interest. service charges. points, loan fees, mortgage insurance, and other items 
(Monarc h Homes. 2005)." 
any penalties (Lord). The Real Estate Sett lement Procedures Act (RES PA) requires 
lenders to clearly disc lose fees , and supp ly a Good Fai th Est imate, to reasonab ly assess 
the true costs of a Joan. The Home Ownership Eq uity Protection Act (HOEPA) passed 
by Congress in I 994 is des igned to offe r protections to borrowers who enter hi gh cost 
loans. which are defin ed by interest rates that are 8 percent hi gher than Treasury Secu rity 
rates (Senate Com mittee on Banking, 200 I). Because of loose definitions, weak 
pena lties, and the abilit y of lenders to adapt and wo rk around them, very littl e protection 
has actua ll y been provided by these regulations, and they have not signi ficantly reduced 
the abuses faced by many low-i ncome, minority and elderl y homeowners (Lord , 2005; 
Senate Com mitt ee on Bank ing). Every year si nce I 999 has seen new state regulati on 
c fTort s to address predatory lending, though many of these efforts consist of very loose 
and ineffecti ve statutes (Engel & McCoy). To complicate the matter, turf battl es rage 
between state and fede ral regulatory agencies over who has jurisdiction over certain 
lenders and geographical areas (Lord; U . . Department of Housi ng, 2000). 
Purpose of Study 
Utah possesses at least three alarming indi cators of financial trouble: ( I) The state 
ranks number three out of all 50 states for bankruptcy per household (Ameri can 
Bankruptcy Institute, 2004); (2) It ran ks in the top ten for foreclosures (M itchell , 2003); 
and (3) It ranks in the top ten fo r instances of mortgage fraud (Federal Bureau of 
Investigat ion, 2005). In addition to these strong financial indicators, a fo rmal estimation 
by Stein (2001) concluded that Utah consumers were victi ms of$9 1 million wo rth of 
predatory lending scams in 2000, with increasing losses ex pected in subsequent years. 
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Predatory mortgage lending is indeed a serious and escalating prob lem, spec ifical ly for 
Utah. but because there is no agreed upon definiti on of predatory lending it is very 
diffic ult to track and regulate 
The purpose of thi s study was to assess the nature of abusi ve and hi gh-cos t 
(predatory) loans in Utah. Because mortgage lending profess ionals have the most 
frequent interactions with mortgage lenders and borrowers than any other group in the 
state, they arc considered the foremost experts on the matter, and are therefore the focus 
or samp le of thi s stud y. Predatory mortgage lending will be examined in the context of 
mortgage lending profess ionals' experiences, perspecti ves, and expert opinions. 
Objec ti ves 
Each of the fol lowing objec ti ves will be measured according to the perceptions 
and perspectives of the twe lve fttll-timc mortgage market partic ipants: 
I. oncept uali ze a definition of predatory mort gage lending. 
2. Determine the ex tent or magnitude of predatory loans in Utah. 
3. Iden tify the common characteristi cs of the victims of these loans. 
4. Identi fy the major facto rs behind the ex istence of high cost and abusive home loans. 
5. Document specific predatory practi ces seen in home loans. 
6. Determine opt imal strategies for reducing predatory mortgage lending in Utah. 
Contributions of the Study 
The results of this study offer a unique definition of predatory mortgage lending 
in Utah by more extensively defining the problem so that regulation and education might 
consequent ly be more effective. 
Increased awareness of the nature of unscrupulous lending can lead to fu rther 
consumer education and responsiveness, thus significantly reducing the $9 1 million 
figure curren tl y lost by Utah borrowers each year (Stein, 2001). As thi s market 
ineffi ciency is remedied , market forces wi ll drive predatory lenders out of business whi le 
increasing the success of legitimate lenders. Society as a whole will then benefit through 
a decrease in foreclosures in neighborhoods, increased eq uity in the homes of borrowers, 
and increased homeownership rates . 
The succeeding chapter is a review of relevant li terature and sources that offers a 
further description of the mortgage lending market. Differences and similarities between 
the prime, subprime and predatory markets, and a comparison to mo11gagc fraud are 
emphasized. A general discussion ofbO JTower and lender characteri sti cs is presented , 
and the chapter conc ludes with a description of some of the predatory practi ces that have 
been identified in previous research. 
CHAPT ER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Hi storica l Factors 
8 
The 1949 Housing Act se t in place the too ls needed for many to rea li ze the 
American dream of ownership of quality homes. Today, thi s dream has been ach ieved by 
many Americans and the issues fac ing today's prospecti ve buyers seems to no longer be 
the abi lity to find quality housing, but the affordability of these houses (Colton, 2003). 
Deregulati on of the mortgage lending market was one answer to the problem of 
affordab ility (Engel & McCoy, 2002). Due to increased freedom to lend without 
government imposed caps on interes t rates and fees, and the ability to trade bundles of 
securiti zed loans on the market and to qui ckly estimate a borrower's credit ri sk, lenders 
have become far more willing to lend large amounts of money to very ri sky borrowers 
(Engel & McCoy). Thus nearly anyone can secure a loan at some price, though that price 
may be astronomical (Engel & McCoy). And thus follows what some have ca ll ed the 
mortgage lending cri sis. 
Ca uses a/! he !vfongage Crisis 
Rises in consumer cred it card debt and the introduction of the 1986 Tax Reform 
Law created an incentive for many to seck debt conso lidation pl ans through subprime 
lenders in order to take advantage of t he tax deductibi lity of home loan interest (Lord, 
2005; Senate Commillee on Banking, 200 I). This encouraged consumers to convert 
unsecured debt in to secured debt which is backed by thei r own homes (Lord; Senate 
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Committee on Banking). Additiona ll y, each refin anc ing or consolidation strips eq uity 
from one 's home because of the borrowing aga inst equity, but more irnportam ly, because 
o f excess ive fees that often do not benefit the borrower in any way. A person delinquent 
on a conso lidated home loan will see their home on the auct ion block afte r mi ss ing on ly 
several payments, and littl e opportunity for negotiation (Lord) . 
The alternative to home loan debt consolidation, however, is reten ti on of 
unsecured debt. Those with large unsecured debts who choose not to consolidate face 
co ll ection harassment and high rates of bankruptcy, leaving them with impaired cred it 
scores and little opportunity for prime rates in the future (Lord, 2005). ThoL•gh many 
wo uld say that consumers have brought these debt traps upon themselves, it is clea r that 
these two scenarios leave litt le room for consum er optimism today. 
ln cretlsing Ileal Est(l{e Values 
The va lues of rea l estate in the country increased substantia ll y through the 90s, 
hav ing a particular impact on low and moderate income homeowners. The ex panded 
home equit y made it possible for many to borrow ex tensively against thei r homes, and 
encouraged lenders to loan based on eq uity and not monthly affordabilit y (Senate 
Comm ittee on Banking, 2001 ). Asset based loans are the main course of predatory 
lenders because it allows the lender to ea rn immediate profits through equity stripping in 
add iti on to the usual overpriced monthl y payments, making these loans ex tremely 
lucrati ve (Sturdevelll & Brennan, 1999). The more times the lender can refinance the 
same customer. the more fees they strip fro m the horne 's equity. 
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Mortgage Broker Proliferation 
Growing from 100,000 to over I million from 1993 to 1999, the number of homes 
brokcrcd in the subprime market has ex ploded (Center for Policy Alternati ves, 2005). An 
Assoc iation for the Advancement of Retired Persons (AARP) research report (Kim-S ung 
& Hermanson, 2003) found that brokers arc in vo lved in over half of all hom e loan 
closings, with a steadil y rising number each year. Brokers have been known to play a 
large role in predatory lending practi ces due to connicting incenti ves. Brokers arc 
encouraged to find the best loans for consumers, yet at the same time they arc often paid 
more fo r signing up consumers wi th more ex pensive loans (Kim-Sung & Hermanson). 
Additional ly, the brokers ha ve no incenti ve to ensure long-term stability of loans because 
they do not ho ld loans through maturit y (Ki m-Su ng & Hermanson). In short , brokers arc 
o rt en confi·ont ed with an array ofcon ni cting motivations. 
Three Mortgage Markets 
Only through a di scuss ion of the separate mortgage markets and practices in each 
market can predatory lending be understood in an app ropriate contex t. Relevant 
lit erature gives an illustration of predatory lending, and how it evo lved from previous 
mortgage lending market condit ions. 
Prime Market 
The prime market offers traditional loans to low-risk borrowers (Engel & McCoy, 
2002). Compared to subprime and predatory loans, these loans are relati ve ly 
straightforward , and simple to understand, and include onl y minimal fees, wh ich are 
II 
usually quite small. Prime market customers are usually better educated and have better 
resources ava ilab le to them for understanding the tenns of loans than subprime 
customers. 
Suhprime Markel 
In the 1980's banks began widely using a tool generally known as ''asse t-backed 
sec uriti es" to rea li ze profits more rapidly (Lord, 2005). Loans were bundled together in 
groups of hundreds or thousands, and so ld on the stock market as mortgage backed 
securiti es (Lord). Even foreclosure did not pose ri sk of loss to securi ty investors because 
the loss from each foreclosu re was absorbed by the thousands of other loans included in 
the securit y, was protected by the homeowners own equity, and was further shie lded 
through overpriced credit insurance (Lord ; Senate Committee on Banking, 200 I). 
The re lati vely safe investment opportuniti es were sold at slightly lower rates on 
Wall Street than the borrowers were paying. The difference became millions of doll ars 
of nea rl y instant profits to the lenders (Lord, 2005). With operating costs covered and 
profi ts sk immed off, the bulk of the bi llion dol lar transactions cou ld be funn eled ri ght 
back into poo ls for lending to homcbuycrs. The lending industry's liquidity of billions 
had been increased through the securit izati on of loans in the secondary market, making 
avai lab le unprecedented leve ls of cash for lending (Senate Committee on Banking, 200 I). 
Meanwhi le, the abil ity to quickl y convert high-rate, high-risk loans into nea rl y instant 
profits has turned even the ri skiest borro wers into potential gold mines (Lord , 2005). 
And thus, widespread subprime lending was born. 
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Most subprimc lenders are nonbank institutions or bank subsidiaries (Engel & 
McCoy, 2002). Legitimate subprime lenders tailor thei r loans to those borrowers deemed 
1·iskie r because of short or tarni shed credit hi stori es (Engel & McCoy). Smith and 
lmmcrgluck (2004) found that the forec losure rate in the subprime market is 20 times 
higher than in the prime market, ren ecting at least in part the increased ri sk iness of the 
ma rket and need fo r increased costs (Engel & McCoy). To hedge agai nst th e increased 
risk o f these loans, subprime lenders generall y charge higher rates than prime lenders, but 
the charges closely renect the credit ri sk of each particular borrower (Engel and McCoy). 
Prerf(I{Orl' Markel 
Though red lining is now illega l, bank s continue to shy away from serving low-
income, minority, single women, and elderly househo lds, and instead set up subprimc 
branches or subsidiaries to serve them (Lord, 2005). Nondepository instituti ons which 
arc not assoc iated with banks also bui ld stores in these areas. Though these subprime 
branches are supposed to cover the basic lend ing needs in these areas, Enge l and McCoy 
(200 I) reported that many borrowers never approach a lending institution of any kind 
because they believe they lack necessary credenti als for a loan. Predatory lenders can 
therefore actively solicit these neighborhoods wit h litt le or no competition from 
legitim ate lenders, in spite of exorbit ant prices. Combine the lack of competiti on with 
borrower naivety and a prime target area for predatory loans is found . Predatory lending 
is of course not limited only to areas fitting thi s description, but acco rding to many 
reports, pockets of rampant predatory lending often occur in them (Engel & McCoy). 
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In the sense that most victims of predatory loans are low-income, minority, 
elderl y, si ngle female and have poor cred it, the prob lem of predatory lending is primari ly 
a subprime market phenomenon (Engel & McCoy, 2002). Predatory lenders target 
individua ls who are naYve, or not parti cul arl y financiall y savvy, and lack connec ti ons to 
the prime market (Engel & McCoy). Deception, unethica l procedures, and hard sell 
tactics are used to trick and trap these borrowers into loans with high fees and rates, 
which di sproportionately benefit the lender, and harm the borrower (Engel & McCoy). 
It is not necessary, however, that a loan be subprime in order to be predatory. 
Sometimes obscure cases of predatory lendin g occ ur in the prime market , though the vast 
majorit y of predatory lending occ urs in the rea lm of the subprime market (Enge l & 
McCoy, 2002). Figure I depicts the relat ionship of predato ry lending among the prime 
and subprime markets, and also int rod uces the concept o f mortgage fraud which is 
subseq uen tl y di scussed. Figure I docs not represent accurate market sizes but is meant 
on ly to represent the overlapping characteristics of these markets. 
Whi le prime and subprime transactions genera ll y offer mutual benefi t to the 
lenders and the buyers, predatory loans offe r disproportionate benefit to the lenders and 
harm to the borrowers (Engel & McCoy, 2002). In a very genera l sense any lender can 
be a predatory lender si mpl y by adding excess ive fees and interest rat es to an otherwise 
mutually benetlc ial loan, or by excess ively or deceitfully pushing a loan or loan products 
on a customer. The exact defi nitions of excess and deceit , however, have become the rea l 
roadblock in affecting regulation, parti cularl y in the subprime market. 
Subprime 
Market 
Figure I . Overlap ping markets. 
Prime 
Market 
It is agreed that subprimc lenders fill a parti cular niche in the lending industry. 
They agree to lend to ri skier indi viduals as long as they are allowed ti er price, or to 
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charge each borrower according to hi s/her ri sk iness. This can effectively alter the cost o f 
the very same loan by thousands of do llars, depending on the individual. The rea l 
diffi cult y in the subprime market is de termining when a lender is simply charging rates to 
cover potenti al losses, or excessively charging a customer, thus turning the loan into a 
predatory one. According to the 2000 HUD/Treasury report , the differences can be 
s li ght , but di sastrous (U.S. Department of Housing, 2000). 
Predatory lending may invo lve mortgage fraud schemes that contain some type o f 
materi al mi sstatement, misrepresentat ion, or omiss ion relied upon by an underwriter, 
lender or borrower, to fu nd, insure, or purchase a loan (Federal Bureau of Investi gation, 
2005). Perpetrators of mortgage fraud arc either ·' fra ud for profit" insiders, or " fraud for 
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housing·· borrowers (Federal Bureau o f In vesti gation). Fraud-for-housing cases involve a 
borrower deliberately misstating income, employment, or other informati on for the 
purpose of acquiring or mainta ining homeownership. The majorit y of fraud-for-p rofit 
cases in vo lve thi rd party brokers, or broker netwo rks (broker, apprai ser, attorney, title 
compa ny, inspecto r), who deliberately mi srepresent information to mort gage lenders, 
underwriters or borrowers fo r the purpose of increasing their profits from a transac tion 
(Federa l Bureau oflnvest igat ion). Predatory lending often invo lves fraud against 
borrowers, but even when the lender or underwriter is the target of broker fraud , the 
borrower is nearl y always a secondary victim because their loans become overpri ced, and 
undercollatera li zed, leading to high monthly payments, less chance of refinanc ing, and a 
hi gher t·isk of fo reclosure (Engle & McCoy, 2002). 
There is no line between mortgage fraud and predatory mortgage lending because 
they often ove rl ap (as referenced in Figure I; Engel & McCoy, 2002; Federa l Bu reau of 
Investigation , 2005). In many instances a broker could be involved in bot h preda tory 
lending and fraud. For example, a broker who contacts a homeowner facing foreclosure 
offers to refinance. The home is actuall y worth $60,000 but unbeknownst to the 
borrower, the broker fill s in the paper work claiming the house to be worth $ 100,000. 
The broker then turns in the paper wo rk to the lendi ng company that pays the hi ghest 
commi ss ion on the loan, and the loan is approved. Both the lender3 and the borrower are 
victimized, while the broker receives a larger com mission from the inn ated price of the 
home. The borrower is left with monthly payments she can' t afford, and the lenders have 
1 While it is possible that the lender ;mel the broker C<lll be from the same co mpany, more and more 
loans each ycJr are being arranged by tndepend('nt brokers who have little vesttd lllh.'l"l'SI in the 
long term stability of the lending companil·s. 
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litt le co llatera l from which to regain their investment when the borrower can' t pay 
(Federal Bureau of Inves ti gati on). Actual fraud is not necessary for a loan to be 
considered predatory, but the act of fraud against a borrower is a suffi cient reason to label 
a loan as such (Engel & McCoy). 
Characteri sti cs of Predatory Mortgage Lending 
Predatory lending is a business of ol icitati on. Because their terms are generall y 
unfair, and damaging. they arc not li ke ly to be very competiti ve in the traditional 
mo rtgage lending market. Therefore, predatory lenders do not wa it for borro wers to 
come looking fo r them; rather, they acti vel y search the market for vulnerab le borrowers. 
The ideal customer fo r a predatory lender is someone who has done li ttl e or no shopping, 
has presupposed that because of little or damaged credit that they cannot qualify for a 
loan, and has significant amounts of equ ity already bu il t up in their home. It is not 
necessary that a customer fit all these criteri a, but such customers are oficn clustered in 
certa in areas, such as low-income, minority, and aging neighborhoods. Strategica ll y 
placed billboards, ad vert ising in the predominant neighborhood language, and telephone 
and door-to-door solic it ations are some o f the more pop ul ar mark et ing techniques 
emp loyed. Once at the door, a comb ination of hard-se ll tactics, fri endliness, and an aura 
of success lead the customer to commit to contracts and believe that the lenders have 
their int erest at heart (Lord, 2005). 
The majorit y of predatory lending occ urs as refin ancings and home equity loans, 
as opposed to o ri ginal home purchases (Quercia, Stegman, & Davis, 2004). One of the 
main eli ffcrences between these two types of loans is the amount of equity the borrower 
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already has in their home. Predatory lenders often exploit this equity by engaging in 
asset-based lending practices (Engel & McCoy, 2002). Loans without regard for the 
bo rrower's ability to pay seem to be aga inst the lender' s best interest because of costly 
forec losures, and the loss of earn ings fro m reg ul ar monthl y payments in the event o f a 
fo rec losure. When examined closely, however, it is ev ident that lenders still ga in through 
eq uity stripping. In fac t, equ it y stri pp ing is one o f the quickest methods a lender can 
realiLc large profits (Engel & McCoy). 
In genera l, equity stripp ing occurs when a lender qualifies a borrower for monthly 
payments in excess of30-50% of their monthl y income, depending on other financial 
obliga ti ons (Engel & McCoy, 2002). There are even some documented instances of 
lenders requir ing monthly payments on a loa n in excess of I 00% of the borrower's 
mont hl y income (Lord, 2005). Nea rl y all of these loans sooner or later exceed the 
bo rrower's capac it y of payment and the borrower wi ll default on the loan. With defau lts 
come late fees, a source of profit for lenders, but more im portant ly, an opportunity to 
offer another refinancing package. The same lender wi ll then approach the borrower and 
offer to help them avo id forec losure by refin anci ng. This new loan package will usually 
include a slightl y reduced interest rate, appearing to make the monthl y payments more 
affordable. But fees for end ing the original loan, and fees for process ing the new loan are 
usually so large that they wi ll usually offse t any sav ings that might have been rea lized 
through a reduced interest rate (Engel & McCoy). A portion of the fees are then stripped 
fro m the equ ity in the home, and any remaining unpaid fees are ro ll ed into the loan 
principle and incur interest over the li fe of the loan (Engel & McCoy). 
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Spcci fi e Practi ces 
As previous ly explai ned, predatory lending cannot be explained so lely by a li st of 
~g rcg i o u s practices because preda tory lending is also a function of ci rcum stances. 
Therefo re the follo wing li st is not a co mprehensive ex planation of predatory mortgage 
lending, but rather a li st of the more common practi ces that are used in conjuncti on wi th 
vu lnerab le borrower circ umstances. 
Flipping 
Flipping is the repeated refinancing ora borrower's loans (Lord, 2005; U. S. 
Departmen t ofl-lousing, 2000). Because prepayment penal ti es, open ing, and clos ing 
cos ts can easil y outweigh the benefit s o r a reduced interest rate, the borrower is often left 
worse ofTa lier repeated refinancing, hav ing had equity stripped from the home each time 
(Lord; U.S . Department of Housing). 
/Jalloon Payme//[s//1/[erest-On~)l Loans 
Balloon payments are des igned to lower the month ly payments of the borrower. 
Often the bo rrower's monthl y payments are onl y hi gh enough to cover the interest on the 
loan, and in ex treme cases the monthly payments do not even cover the interest, leading 
to nega ti ve amorti zation. After paying for 15 or 30 years on a loan, the borrower will 
find that the fin al payment is the origina l borrowed amo un t or more, or in other words, 
the ent ire principal of the loan is still due. Often the onl y way a borrower can pay a 
balloon payment is by getting another loan (Engel & lcCoy, 2002 ; Lord, 2005; U. 
Department of Hous ing, 2000). 
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Prepay111ent Penalties 
According to Farris and Richardson (2004), on ly about 2% of conform ing, or 
prime loans have prepayment penalties, whil e 70% ofsubprime loans have them. 
Trad itionall y, a prepayment penall y is des igned to hedge against the ri sk of the borrower 
refinanc ing a loan in the first few years of the loan, which reduces the amount o f profit 
the lender makes from the transaction over the long run (Farri s & Ri chardson). The 
I nders would offer reduced interest rates if the borrower entered illlo a prepayment 
penalty com ract. However, the majority of loans with prepaymelll pena lties, accordi ng to 
Farris and Richardson, actually had higher interest rates than loans without them. 
l'11cking 
With packing, borrowers are often so ld ex tra loan products or charged fees 
without th ei r knowledge or consent. The fees are then rolled into the loan and financed, 
effectively increasing the monthly payments of t he borrower. ll is often because of thi s 
action that borrowers are quoted a much lower monthly payment onl y to later find their 
monthl y payments as much as two times higher (U.S. Department of Housing, 2000). 
Excessi ve Fees 
The HUD/Treasury report (U.S Department o f Housing, 2000) sa id that the large 
fees bei ng charged by some subprime lenders were not j usti fi ed by the credit ri sk of their 
borrowers. Prepaymelll penalties in parti cu lar, whil e onl y one of the many fees, were 
sa id to be abusi ve because they strip equity from a home if the borrower chooses to 
refinance or sell during the firs t years of a loan (Lord, 2005 ; U.S. Department of 
Housing, 2000). 
Lending /Vitlwut Regard to t!te Borroll'er ·s 
Ability to Repav 
It is no t uncommon for mon thl y payments on a subprime loan to exceed 50 
percen t of th e borro wer's income (Lord, 2005; U.S. Department o f Housing, 2000). 
Mo nth ly payment s on home loa ns arc enco ura ged not to exceed 30% or a borrower' s 
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income (Co lt on, 2003). Occu rrences we re documented by HUD in ves ti gators in whi ch 
payments on a loan actuall y exceeded the borrower's total monthl y income (Lo rd; U.S . 
Department of Hous ing). Brokers ga in qui ck cash from such scenarios through hi gh 
upfront fees, and fast securitization of the loan, whi le in vestors in th e sec uriti es a re 
pro tec ted from losses by di versificati on over tho usands of loans, and th e actual houses 
being used as co ll ateral (Lord; U.S. Departm ent of Housing). 
Outright Fmud 
The most common cases of fraud against the borrower in vo lve fa lsifi ca ti on of a 
borrower' s income or home va lue. T hi s can put bo rrowers in a precarious s ituation; 
be ing unabl e to a fford the loan , and unabl e to refinance because lenders wi ll shy away 
fro m such a large loan, w ith so littl e co ll ateral (Lo rd , 2005; U. S. Departm en t of Housing, 
2000). 
Credil lnsum nce 
C redit insurance is designed to protec t th e lender in the event that the bo rrower 
dies, becomes disab led, or unemployed (Lord , 2005). It has no inherelll benefits for the 
borrower (Lord). Most other types of insurance pay 65 to 85 cen ts in c lai ms for every 
dollar o f insurance purchased, and the sugges ted minimum payout by th e Na tio na l 
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Associati on of Insurance Commissioners (NA IC) is 60 cents for every dolla r (Lord). ln 
2002 the payout for the 22 1 credit hea lth and accident companies reporting to A IC 
averaged a payo ut of on ly 49.4 cents per dol lar (Lord). Additionall y in that same year 
credit life insurance companies onl y paid 41 .5 cents per dollar, a far cry from industry 
norms (Lord). If these compani es had charged industry suggested rates then consumers 
would have saved nearl y $800 million in 2002 (Lord). Many cred it insurance companies 
are actual ly subsidiaries of the major mortgage lenders (Lord). 
Single Premium Credit fn snrance 
Poli shed mortgage brokers are ab le to se ll singl e premium credit insurance. 
Because a single premium policy can be thousands of dollars, the brokers will o ffer to 
linance it , or mi l the premium into the rest o f the loan. Insurance poli cies o ft en las t on ly 
5 years, but when financed, the borrower pays interest on the policy through the li fe of 
the loan. Someone entering a 30-year mort gage in 1975 would only be covered until 
1980 by hi s/her credit policy, but would be paying interest on thi s po li cy until 2005, we ll 
beyond the use of the poli cy (Lord, 2005). 
Servicing 
Bund les of loans are so ld from the ori ginal lender to other investo rs. The job of 
co ll ec ting monthly payments is then given to a mortgage service compan y. Some 
mortgage servicing companies have pa rti c ipated in predatory practices, such as failure to 
post payments promptly resulting in late fees for the borrower; misrepresenting the 
amounts consumers owed, and; fai ling to make payments on propert y taxes and insurance 
fi·o m escrow account s, sometimes causi ng the bo rrower to lose their insurance o r even 
thei r house because of past-due tax co ll ectio ns. 
Other Ahuses 
Accordi ng to Sturdevant and Brennan ( 1999), oth er abuses can inc lude rac ia l 
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targeting in adverti sing; loans in connect ion with a home improvement scam; steering or 
leadi ng bo rrowers to hi gh cost lenders; k ickbac ks (paym ents) to th ird part y p layers 
(broker, appraiser, ano rn ey, t itl e company, inspec tor) for steerin g bo rrowers to hi gh cost 
loans; hi gh annual inte rest rat es; padd ed o r d uplicative c losing costs and fees; mandato ry 
arbit rati on c lauses and associated loss o f lega l rights; shi fting unsecured debt into 
mort gages; and fo reclosure abu ses. 
C harac te ri stics o f Borro wers 
111i l the 1970s some bank execut ives a ll egedl y drew red lines a round low-
income and mino rit y neighborhoods, d isco uraging brokers from lending mo ney in those 
areas, a practi ce kn own as " red lin ing" (Lo rd , 2005). The practice was o ffi c ia ll y ended in 
1973 w ith the passage of the Home Mo rt gage Disc los ure and Communi ty Re in vestment 
Ac ts, though instances since continue to be doc umented (Lord) . Predatory lenders have 
p icked up whe re th e banks le ft off, and have begun to "green- li ne" or ta rge t low-income, 
an d minority neighborhoods (Newman & Wyly, 2002; Z immerman, Wyly, & Botein, 
2002). 
A study inc ludin g 10 metropo litan areas found that concelllrati ons o f s ubprime 
lending were fo und accordi ng to d istr ibutions o f e lderl y and m ino ri ty popula tions, and 
not accord ing to cred it risk , indica ting that those who were elderly or minority were 
much more likely to have a subprimc loan regardless of cred it score (Na tional 
Community Reinvestment Coalition, 2004). Severa l additional studies have veri fied 
these findings (Newman & Wyly, 2002; Zimmerman et al., 2002). Moreover, large 
concentrat ions ofsubprime lending ha ve been found in low-income neighborhoods 
(Calcm. 1-i crshaff, & Wachter, 2004; Schill & Wachter, 1993; U.S. Department of 
Housing, 2000). Farris and Ri chardson (2004) fou nd that the li ke li hood of hav ing a 
prepayment penalty included in a loan was more hi ghl y correlated wi th rural and 
minority hom eowners than wi th cred it ri sk. 
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Lenders have fo und a variety of ways in which to find and ta rge t potenti al 
bo rrowers who may be less educated, lack ex peri ence with leg itimate lenders, li ve fa r 
from legitimale lenders, may lack adequate resources fo r shopping for loans such as a 
telephone or transportation, have large amoun ts of equ ity in their homes, and are behind 
on propert y taxes or in need of home repai rs (Engel & McCoy, 2002). HMDA data 
repo rts where prime lenders operate (and do not operate) . Census data show the exact 
location and percentages of minoriti es and income categories in neighborhoods. The tax 
offi ce and deed registry shows who is close to paying off their mortgages, and those 
de li nquent on property ta xes. Another, common method used by home improvement 
seammers is to simply dri ve by poorer neighborhoods in search o f houses with obvious 
needs for improvement on the ex teri or, and then offer these homeowners a home-
improvement loan, of course wi th high and hidden costs (Engel & McCoy). 
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Lending Factors 
Alain Sn·ee/ Lenders 
It is estimated that brokers handl e about half of all mortgage loans (Senate 
Committee on Banking, 200 I). Brokers ha ve incentives to steer bo rrowers to lenders that 
pay brokers the most rather than to lenders who give borrowers the most fa vo rab le terms 
(Senate Committee on Banking). In addition to brokers; lenders, real estate developers, 
and rea l estate agen ts are often paid a commi ssion based on the value of the loans they 
secure ( at ional Community Reinvestment Coa lition, 2005). Appraisers a! o get 
dragged in to the mix and can face ex treme amounts of pressure to deli ver overstated 
values (National Community Rein vestment Coa lition). Appraisers who do not de li ver the 
sought afte r·, overstated va lues are often withhe ld paymen ts, threatened with loss of 
business, and are sometimes even blacklisted by lenders. Lenders have also been known 
to ·'shop around" for appraisers for each propert y, choosing the one that gives the highest 
price estimate ( ational Com munity Reinvestment Coalition). Whether actual co llusion 
among mortgage market profess ionals is voluntary or forced is not as relevant as the mere 
recognition that incenti ves between actors in the market often leads them to pursue 
ac ti vities that are not in the best interest o f the borrowers. 
Wall S11·ee1 Lenders 
Table one shows that predatory lending is not an iso lated phenomenon, but 
instead is a widespread failure in the mortgage market. Wall Street firms co nt inue to 
directl y and indirectl y support predatory practices. Conseco Financial (G reen Tree), for 
example, would not have been ab le to ca rry out its injurious practices wi thout the backing 
of some big Wall Street names. ix insurance and mutual fu nd (i nvestment) companies 
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were the main purchasers of Conseco mor1gage backed securities at the time of its $27 
million seulemenl: Denver based Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co., Japan based 
Nippon Li fe Insurance, L.A. based Met West Financial , Boston based John Hancock 
Financial Services, Iowa based PFL Life Insurance, and Pittsburg based Me ll on Financ ial 
Corp (Lord, 2005). Given the tendenc y of investment corporations to make in formed 
investment decisions, it is reasonable to assume that Conseco's widely critici zed lending 
practices were wel l known to these in vestors who made the decision to purchase shares of 
the securities any\\ ay, based not on moral perspect ive but on alluring potential returns. 
Ironica ll y, it is conceivable that those who were injuriously overcharged by Conseco 
were also ow ners of life insurance polici es, or mutual fund investments made in the 
above named companies and therefore may have indirectl y financed their own thi eves. 
An interesting note is that the settl ements IJ·om Household Financial and the 
Associa tes are the largest non- tobacco consumer sett lements in hi story. Also worth note 
is that despite the large total of the settl ements, the compensation to individual victims is 
still far from adequate for even covering the losses they incurred from lending abuses, 
and arc fa r from innicting any puniti ve or di sc iplinary costs to the compani e (ACORN, 
2003). 
Summary 
Because predatory mortgage lending is a relative ly new phenomenon, and the 
problem itse lf is so broad and undefined , on ly a handful of academic research arti cles on 
the topic exist (Calem et al. , 2004; Elliehausen & Staten, 2002, 2003; Harvey & Nigro, 
2002; Hogarth & Hilgert, 2002; Lax, Manti , Raca, & Zom, 2004; Morgan Stanley, 
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2002; Quercia. Stegman & Davis, 2003, 2004; Stein, 200 I). Many of these stud ies have 
limi ted scopes that do not adequately cover all features of predatory lending, bu t focus 
instead on very limited and incompl ete features. This is not to say that these studi es are 
useless; in fa ct they have furth ered the accep tance of the reality oC predatory lending to 
the point ofinnu encing some state and federal regulations. However, confusion still 
looms among regulators, industry lenders, and even eonsumers on what exac tl y predatory 
lending entai Is . Thi s research will enable predatory lending in Utah to be understood 
through expert opinions of those who regul arl y witness predatory lending and its effects, 
first hand . 
CHAPTER Ill 
METHODS 
The Qua litative Research Paradigm 
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The core goa l of thi s research was to defin e predatory mortgage lending acco rding 
to the understandings of home loan professionals for the purposes of future education and 
regul ati on. Because views and understand ings of the topic were expec ted to be diverse, 
and somewhat unpredictable, a more nat uralist, or qualitative approach was appropriate 
(Rubin & Ru bin, 2005). Th is research was also facilitated by a detailed log of decisions 
made throughout the research process, including rencc ti ve thoughts of the principal 
in vesti gator, as consistent with the qualitati ve ap proach described by Creswell (2003) and 
Rossman and Rallis (2003). Particularl y during the in terviews, thi s approach was use ful 
for capturing highlights, nonverba l evidence, and initia l emergence o f important concepts 
and themes. Addi tionall y, an assistant researcher with previous ex perience in qualitati ve 
studies also served as second evalua tor fo r the purpose of triangulati on and verification 
throughout the research process (Rossman & Ralli s). 
Consistent wi th the modern qual itati ve approach (Creswe ll , 2003), the data 
co ll ected from the interviews were not limited to verbal responses, but also included 
vo ice inncc ti ons and nonverbal cues, as we ll as personal records, relevant documents, 
cmail s. and so fo rth , as explained later in the data co llection procedures. Interviews were 
also conducted in the interviewee's natural setti ng as suggested by Creswell , meaning 
tha t the mortgage lend ing profess iona ls were asked to choose the locati on of the 
intervi ew. All part icipants chose their primary place of business, or a simila r selling. 
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Creswel l di scussed that advantages of the natu ra l setting include the abi lit y for the 
resea rcher to witness high levels of detail about the interviewee's environ ment and allows 
the researcher to become highl y invo lved in the interviewee's daily experi ences. The 
primary role of the researcher was to guide the interview between each main questi on 
using fo ll ow- up questi ons and probes, a method of interviewing that is disc ussed later. 
Unit of In vesti gation 
Mortgage lending pro fess ionals are arguabl y the most know ledgeab le people 
ava ilable to assist with the understanding of predatory mortgage lending. Intuiti ve ly, 
mortgage pro fess ionals deal with mort gage borrowers and lenders on a regular, fu ll -ti me 
basis, and therefore, are in a positi on to witn ess their dail y interac ti ons, dea ls, and 
cli sagrccmcnts. A mortgage lending professional can be loosely defined as any person 
whose career requires regular, full -time contac t with either mortgage borrowers, 
mortgage lenders, or both . Dut ies of a mortgage lending pro fess ional range anywhere 
from educa tion and counse li ng, to regulation or business. Because the pu rpose of thi s 
research was to more accurately define predatory lending as it currentl y ex ists in Utah, 
the unit of in vesti gation was the mortgage lending professional. 
Sample and Recruitment 
As opposed to large sca le surveys where quant ity and frequency of opinions are 
sought (Morgan Stanley, 2002), thi s study encouraged a detai led qualitati ve approach. 
Each interviewed professional was encouraged to contribute a significant amount of 
detail to hi s/her responses, so that a ric hl y informati ve illustration o f notewo rth y detail s 
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was poss ible. The se lec ti on o f part ic ipants began with a preliminary list that was 
compiled by the primary and ass istant researchers. This pre lim inary li st was suggested 
by several professional acquain tances of the researchers who had previously been 
in vo lved wi th some of the groundwork for thi s project. Those officials who participated 
initially were asked to identify other potenti al parti cipants who could offer additional 
insights about predatory mortgage lending. These suggestions comprised the remainder 
of the samp le. Thi s method of sam pling is known as snowball , or chain sampling and has 
been used in many qualitati ve studies li ke this one (Pallon, 2002). Specia l effort was 
made to include equal samples o f participants with predisposit ions for consumer 
advocacy, industry advocacy, or neutrality such as regulators. 
Interviewees were initially contac ted by phone or email , at which time the 
primary resea rcher gave his name. uni versity association, and ex plained the top ic of the 
interview. The primary researcher then asked fo r an interview and explained that because 
of the nature o f the interview, the length would be at their di scretion, but wou ld likely last 
between 30 to 90 minutes. At that time incent ives for participation were also ment ioned 
as described in the following paragraph . 
Because of the primary resea rcher's previous experi ence with those in the 
mortgage lending market, it was anti cipated that the vast majo rity o f the sample would 
part icipate with few or no incenti ves. Nevertheless, the pa1ticipants were offered a 
personal copy of the final proj ect as an incentive for their participat ion. Additionall y, the 
primary in vestigato r offered to share hi ghli ghts of the project in classes and workshops 
through which associates of the partici pants may also benefit from thi s research. 
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When an agreement to pa rti cipate was given, a time and a place for the interview 
was then determ ined by the interviewee. At the ti me of the interview, each parti cipan t 
was aga in informed of the purpose of the stud y, poss ible adverse effects of participati on, 
and their ri ghts to withdraw or withhold information. They were also asked to sign the 
Institu ti onal Review Board ( IRB) approved informed consent form as an 
acknowledgment o f thei r dec ision to continue wi th the interview (sec Appendix A). 
The fin al sample included 12 fu ll-time professionals who wo rk in Utah, and who 
were chosen wi thout geographical preference. Although most of the interviewees were 
concentra ted along the Wasatch Front, many have had ex periences working all over the 
state. The final sample inc luded four consumer advocates, fou r industry advoca tes and 
fo ur neutral parti cipants who have 182 years of co ll ec ti ve experience in nearl y every 
conceivabl e Rrea of the mortgage lending market. Consumer advocates have had 
previous ex perience in banking, rea l estate lending, and as loan officers, ed ucators, 
counselors and para legals. Industry advocates have past ex peri ences as lawyers, state 
managers, regional managers, loan offi cers, owners, sa les managers, branch managers, 
nat ional sa les directors, managers of home sa les, and spec ial assets managers. Neutral 
pm·ticipant s have experiences as mort gage brokers, app raisers, rea l estate brokers, asset 
managers, non-profit workers, bankers, lawyers, loan officers, community deve lopers, 
litir housing workers, regulators, and educa tors. Tab le two gives further descripti ve 
dctai Is about the participants. 
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Tab le 2 
llesponde111 Characteristics (n = 12) 
Predisposition 
Consu111er i/dvocotes lndusuy Advocmes Neutral Poniciponts 
Nwnha 
Mole 
Fe111ale 
Al/ean years of 
experience 
4 
I 
3 
8 
4 
4 
0 
13 
Data Col lec tion Procedures 
4 
2 
2 
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While obtaining the proper signature on the IRB approved informed consent form 
and during the co urse of the interview, the primary researcher engaged in initi al 
assessments of the charac teri sti cs of the interv iewee and hi s/her surroundin gs, including 
the in terviewee's gender, genera l age, nature of their place of' emp loymen t (large, small , 
pub li c, private), and other envi ronmental qua lit ies (busy, many coworkers, etc.). Next, 
the in terview questions commenced (see Appendi x B). 
Follow-ups and Probes 
In qualita ti ve interviews, fol low-up quest ions are used to ex plore themes, 
concepts, and ideas introduced by the interviewee (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). Probes are 
used as subt le communications which ask for more detail , or furth er clarificati on of 
prev ious statements (Rubin & Rubin). Fo llow-up and probing questions were 
incorporated into the interviews but were not scri pted because they were used to clarify 
and ex pand on comments made during the interv iew, and were therefo re not foreseeable. 
Examples of follow-up questions inc luded: ' 'Cou ld you te ll me more about what you j ust 
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sa id?" or "What did yo u mean by that?" or " Why is that important?" Simi larl y, probes 
\\'Crc used to indicate for the interv iewee to continue, and keep the interview moving. 
Ex amples of probes were, ··oK," " I see," "'That 's interesti ng," and someti mes even 
inc luded nonverbal cues such as a nod of the head or lift of the eyebrows. The general 
in tent of probes was to show the interviewee that what he/she is saying is of va lue and for 
subtle encouragement to continue (Rubin & Rub in). 
Pilot illlerl'iews 
Two pilot interviews were conducted with the iment of refi ning the interview 
questions. The purpose of these interviews was to clarify any confusi ng wordi ng in the 
questi ons, and to determine the effecti veness of the questions for ex tract ing a useful 
meaning of" predatory lending in Uwh. Feedback from these participants se rved as a 
verifi cati on of the reli ab ility and va lidity of the interview questions by help ing to ensure 
unbiased wording in the main questions. According to these initial participants the main 
questions effectivel y served their purpose of defining and describing predatory mortgage 
lending, and the wording did not require any alteration. 
Procedures 
The participants were interv iewed by using the tree and branch method. The tree 
and branch method desc ribed by Rubin and Rubin (2005) began wi th the main research 
topic: predatory mortgage lending in Utah. This topic was then explored using seven 
main ques tion s and subsequent follow-ups and probes. The result was an array of 
comments that branch from the seven main questions, all of which stem from or describe 
the main topic . The direction, nature and con telll of the responses were thus determined 
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by the interviewees wh ile ensuring a thorough covering of the main research topic (Rubi n 
& Rubin). 
Four types of data co llection are common in qualitati ve research: observa ti on, 
interviews, documents, and audiovisual material s (Creswell , 2003). The primary mode of 
investigation in th is research was through the interv iewing of participan ts as desc ribed 
previously; however, observations, documents, and other ev idence were also used when 
offered by the interviewees. Because all of the interviews took place at the parti cipant 's 
place of employment, observat ion of their environment and interac ti ons were eas il y 
ob tai ned. Likewise, during the course of the interviews, some participants offered the 
resea rcher documents such as addit ional lit erature, offic ial reports, leuers and emai ls, as 
ev idence o r a certain point , and these were used in the final ana lysis. It is worth noting 
that this type or infonnat ion was not solicited during the interviews, but was included as 
evidence on ly when offered at the interviewees' own initiati ves. 
Data Recording Proced ures 
For the interview, the researcher's notes were divided down the middle of the 
page, with one side containing key wo rds and phrases made by the interviewee, and the 
other side containing the researcher's personal thoughts and renect ive no tes. 
Observations of actions and ex press ions of the interviewee, notes on the environment, 
and other occurrences were also included in the renective notes. The columns for the 
interv iew and renect ive notes were paral lel, maintai ning a chronological now of 
comments and ideas as they came, wh ile retai ning a separation of the researcher's notes 
from what was actuall y sa id by the interviewee. Interviews were also aud io recorded, 
and transcrib ed into text for further ana lys is, whi ch is described in the nex t secti on. 
Data Ana lys is Procedures 
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A II the interviews were transcribed into text from their audi o vers ions. As a 
check for maintaining cred ibility of the interviews, the transcribed copies o f the 
interviews were sent to each respec ti ve interviewee via postal mail or email. The 
in terviewees then had a chance to correct, add to, or otherwise change the content of thei r 
interviews, thus serving as a '"member check"' of reli ab ility. 
The interviews and notes were then read through initially to glean the overall 
meaning o f the data co ll ectively. Notes and renec tivc thoughts were written in the 
margins fo r subsequent use. Nex t, general coding of the data began through labeli ng of 
sections of the material by topic . To be consistent with the ideas of the interviewees, the 
labe ls were often terms supplied by them during the interviews, and not terms imposed 
by the resea rcher; these are call ed "i n vivo" codes. Each interview was trea ted on a more 
indi vidual bas is in thi s step. As an addi ti onal step of ensuring reli ability. thi s step of 
labeling was a lso preform ed by both the primary researcher and the assistant researcher 
fo r purposes of comparing consistency and logica lity of labeling. No maj or or persistent 
inconsistencies were found; therefore, the primary researcher coded the rest of the data 
alone. 
Topics were then grouped together and organized into three major categories: 
comments on a defin it ion, comments on a descri ption, and other information. Content of 
the major categories was then divided into several descripti ve categories. The materi al 
36 
11 as then reread; this time the researcher added more speci fie codes fo r the material in the 
descripti ve categories. The interviews at thi s point were treated co llecti vely, meani ng 
tha t there was little recognition as to who the authors of the comments were, but ra ther 
each quote was treated for meaning, and not for it s source of ori gin. The relating nature 
of the quotes helped to organi ze the supporting ev idence into a significant desc ription of 
major and minor concepts that make up predatory mortgage lending. The codes were 
then organized into a narrative or description of predatory lending as supported by the 
evidence in chapter four. This method of managing qualitati ve data was performed on 
NVivo7, a computer software program designed for the puqJose o f analyz ing qualitative 
data (QS R Internationa l, 2005). Thi s so ft ware proved to be user fri end ly and more time 
effi cient than the traditional fold er method. In the narrative, the majo r find ings were 
supported by mu ltiple or longer, more detailed quo tes, whi le unique perspec ti ves were 
suppo rt ed by on ly one or two less deta iled comments. A detai led description of the 
chronologica l protocol of thi s inves ti ga ti on is dep icted in Table 3. 
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Table 3 
The Successive Phases oji11e Investigation 
Phase I Prcparatron 
Phase II - Appro, a! 
Ph~rs l' Ill Pdu1 
lll\('1'\t('\\ S 
Phase Il l Data 
Collection 
Phase IV Dat~l 
An<l lys rs 
Ph;.~sc V Rtporl 
Fmdin~s 
SteJ 
Obtain Oackground 
Form the Interview 
Locate Potential 
J n(('fVIC\\ CCS 
IRB Appr01al 
Cornmrllcc Appro' al 
Obtarn 2 rnirial 
llllti'\IC\\ S 
Refining intcn rew 
guest ions 
Interviewees 
Contacted 
Meet for Interview 
Audio Recorder 
Interview 
Introduction 
JRB Rights 
Research Questions 
Notes 
Transcription 
Revic\\ 
Toprcs l>rbcled 
Org:mi;c toprcs 
Categories 
Add codes 
Evidence 
Discussion 
Report findmgs. 
Through a thorough investigation ofacadcmrc li terature, and a 
conwwcd monrtoring ofcurrcm events for the post two years, the 
primary researcher has acquired an inforrn~d background on the 
topi c of preda tory mortgage lending 
Main interview questions and guide lines h:l\ c been constructed 
from relevant literature. 
A preliminary list ofpotcntii:ll interviewees has been formed. 
The Institutional Review Board (IRO) apprO\ed the study to ensure 
that the nghts of human participants mthc study "ere protected. 
The members of the research cormmttcc approved thrs research. 
fhl' purpOSl' of1hesc in11inl in1crvicws \\<IS for ICS!ing the interview 
quc~lron s lOr conlcnt and re liability. 
Feedback ''as obtarncd fromlhcsc particip~mt s on lhC' usefulness 
and Cl<rrll)' Of the IIIICT\ IC\\ questiOnS. 
The intcrvrew qucstrons did no1 need to be adjustt.x! or refined based 
on feedback of the initial panicipants. 
The first several interviewees were contacted. l'Xplained the purpose 
of the s1udy and asked for an interview. 
Meetings were hl•ld at locatr ons specified by the interviewees. 
The audio recorder was used 
Interviewees again had the purpose of the Stlrdy rc>rd to them. 
lntcn rewees had thei r righ ts as hurnm subjecrs read to them 
includmg the nght to withdraw at any 11111e. 
The rcsc;.~rch ques1ions were asked along with follow·up and 
probing questions. 
1otes \'-'ere 1aken to record thoughts and renections of the 
researcher durin ~ the course of the interview. 
The imcrvicws were transcribed from the audio t<Jpes into text and 
put into fO lders. 
The interview teus and notes were ini tially reviewed for gcner:tl 
meanings ::rnd nature of responses. 
Tht• mtcrviews ;.~nd notes \\ere again rc~1d to c;.~p!Ure the major 
IOJ>I CS. 
lrH.ll\t tlu:tlrrHen rl'\\ S rc\e<.Eied rmponant topics '' hrch address tht· 
m~un research CJltestions and these topics were labck'd 
Top res organi;ed conceptuctlly using NVivo7 l'Onlputcr soH war~· 
Descriptive ca tegories were formed out oft he top1c rml\criul. 
Material w;.~s reread ;:~nd the c<:~tcgory codes were ;JSSigned to 
subsections oft he interviews, sometimes more than one category 
w<Js used for each subsection depending on the interrel~uion of 
concepts. 
The dcfini1ion ofprcdntory mortgage lending yielded itself from the 
major and minor supponing evidence from the intcrviC\\ S. 
The findings will be discussed in light of litcra\Urc and the new 
evidence. 
The findin gs of the rcse<.~rch will be reponed in a thesis project, 
Jc;.~demic :.~rucles. <.rnd 3 report to the Utah Dt vision of Rc;.~ l Eswre. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESU LTS 
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The result s are presented in the same order as the study's objecti ves found at the 
end of chapter one. Thi s conceptual organiza tion was not on ly support ed by the literature 
but also by the par-ticipan ts of th is stud y. First, a de finiti on of predatory lending is 
presented using the words of the ex pert panel. Nex t, descripti ve evidence is presented 
th at addresses objecti ves two through six. These include descriptions of the magnitude of 
predatory lend ing, factors and conditions that spur it s ex istence, practi ces that are 
considered predatory, characteri sti cs o f victims, and suggestions of ways to reduce it. 
Ncar the end of the chapter there is an addi ti onal section that desc ribes the consequences 
of abusive and predatory lendi ng, and whom it affects. 
Research Objecti ve One: A Definition ' 
Ahusi•'e Le11di11g 
··There is a fine line between the pract ice and abusing the pract ice,' ' began a 
preda tory lending speciali st. But when par-t ic ipants were asked the definiti on of abusive 
lend ing it bec ame appare nt that the line was not so fine after all. Simi lar to current 
literature, many oft he par-ticipants began definin g abusive lending by li sting prac ti ces 
that they cons idered abusive. A consumer advocate described, " It 's abusive when people 
get taken adva ntage of and income changes. It 's also abusive when they prey upon the 
elderl y and the uneducated, with high repayment terms in general. " 
~ S~t:' App('ndi .x C fOr diagram or cod ing sc lii.:rne for ('ach objec ti ve 
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The chore of defin ing ab usive lendi ng became much more difficuli by exc luding 
the ci tation of specific practi ces; nevertheless, by pi ec ing together direct re ferences that 
addressed abusive lending, a finn definiti on was deri ved. Therefore, abusive lending 
consists of one or more of the following: (a) a transac tion without a fidu cia ry duty or 
hav ing the borrower 's best interest in mind, (b) a transaction the borrower does not 
completely understand for any reason including age, language barrier, or lack of financial 
savvy, (c) an y transacti on that results in harm to the bOITower, (d ) any loan that de li vers 
the lender excess ive profit s, and (c) any loan that the borrower does not have the ability 
to repay. 
The definition is not perfect , but is a good starting point. One probl em with thi s 
defi nition is that it is so broad th at it may not be app licable in every situation. For 
example, it is theoretica ll y poss ible for a lender not to have the best interest of the 
borrower in mind, but still deli ver a loan that is entirely benefi cial to the borrower. A 
second problem is that the definiti on is not measurable. For example, borrower 
understanding is not easily measured and therefore one could never accurately determine 
whether or not a borrower completely understood hi s or her loan transaction. Imperfec t 
as thi s defin ition may be, it still prov ides a use ful background for ana lyz ing predatory 
lend ing. 
?redmon• Lending 
Si milar to descriptions of abusive lending, parti cipants routinely defined 
predatory lending by ci ting speci fi c acts that are predatory. One neutral parti cipant 
related: 
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Some attempts to define it, that we have seen include things like, " What was the 
loan to va lue rat io? What was the percentage of income, as compared to the 
payment? How many po i Ills above market rate is the person gett ing the loan?" 
Nevertheless, without ci ting speci fi c acti vi ti es, parti cipants were ab le to 
co ll ect ive ly de fin e predatory lending as one or more of the followin g: (a) un fa ir or 
abusive lending practices that arc targeted towards vulnerable borrowers; (b) preying on, 
or taking advantage of borrower vu lnerabili ties; (c) excessive pro fit s from single loans; 
and. (d) a loa n without logical benefit to the borrower. Part (a) of the definition refers 
directly to the previously established definition of abusive lending. Parts (c) and (d) of 
thi s definition also bear a striking resemblance to the defin ition of abusive lending. 
Preda tory lending is therefo re defined through the use of the defi nition of abusive 
lending. In fac t, only one major difference seems to ex ist between them; namely, the act 
of' targeting or preying on indi vidual borrower vulnerabi liti es for predatory lending, 
whereas ab usive lending include the same occurrences, but without a defi ned target. 
Further evidence to support this conclusion is given by participallls who directly 
compared ab usive and predatory lend ing. 
Pret!a/OI)' Lending Versus Ahusive Lending 
Half of the participants ex pli cit ly made statements similar to one made by a 
consumer advocate that ' 'Abusive loans arc the same thing as predatory loans. Prett y 
much one and the same." Thi s relationsh ip is depicted in Figure 2. Other partic ipan ts 
described an overlapping order simi lar to the following idea shared by an indust ry 
advocate, "In the realm of things you've got all lendi ng, and then you've got abus ive 
lendi ng and then yo u have ... predatory." Th is re lationship is shown in Figure 3. 
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Though supported by many sources, the overl ap ping order was not exp li ci tl y supported 
by all, but because these two perspec ti ves are not inherently contradictory it is possible to 
combine them into a hybrid model portrayed in Figure 4. This hybrid mode l supports the 
maj orit y of the participants' exp li cit perspecti ves, and because of the evidence di scussed 
above, it can reasonably be concluded that the differences between preda tory lending and 
ab usive lending arc slight. 
Abusive Lending = Predatory Lending 
Figure 2. Little or nodi fference between abusive and predatory lendin g. 
Al l Lend ing 
Figure 3. The overlapping order of lending. 
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All Le ndi ng 
Figure 4. Hybrid model of abusive and predatory lending. 
Fmu!lulel/l Lending 
Fraud is essentially any ill ega l acti vity in the mortgage lending mark et. The most 
eommon examp les of fraud that were shared by the part icipants included a fai lu re to 
deliver all the req uired disc losu re document at clos ing, and the fa lsification of disclosure 
documents. Fraud is not limited to illegal activi ty th at harms the borrower. One 
participant who deals regularl y with fraud explai ned that fraud can ori gi nate for the sole 
pur·pose of defrauding the lender. For example, if a borrower knowi ngly posed as an 
interested customer and helped a broker to defraud a lender, both the borrower and the 
broker wo uld be members of a conspiracy. The ex pert on fra ud went on to ex pl ai n, 
however, that brokers are capab le of defrauding the lender without disc losing to the 
borrower thier role in the conspi racy: 
If you app roached a member of a vu lnerable class, or single mother, and sa id , 
'·J'm goi ng to give you $500 go ahead and sign these forllls. " That person, 
because they may not understand the lega l requirements or what they are 
commi1ti ng or doing, could also be a vict im . 
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Therefore there are cases of fraud in which both the borrower and the lender are 
si mu ltaneous ly ham1ed. The key is th at borrowers are abused direct ly and indi rectly 
th rough ill ega l ac ti vity, as the fraud ex pert concluded: 
Was the woman ab used?. . I think she was a victim to mortgage abuse. I think 
there were guys that knew enough abo ut the business, to where they knew how to 
formu late a loan package and submit it to an underwriter, and get it approved and 
took advantage of someone who was a victi m and yet they were a party to the 
fraud because they went along with it. 
Fmudulenl Versus Abusive and Preda!OI)' Lending 
To reiterate, the main difference between predatory and abusive lending is the act 
of preyi ng on or targeting a victim, and the main difference between predato ry and 
fraudulent lending is the crossing of lega l boundari es. An industry representati ve stated, 
"Fra ud can be both abusive and predatory," or ill ega l ac ts can be and often are targeted 
and harm fu l. According to the comparati ve ev idence ment ioned, another element can be 
added to the figure depicting the relati onships of tenns in Figure 5. While certainly not 
precise in proportions, the idea illustrated in thi s fi gure is that according to our 
participants, the terms ab usive lending, predatory lending, and fraud (aga inst the 
borrower) arc very sim ilar, and often used interchangeabl y. 
Figure 5 bears remarkab le simil ariti es to Figure I that was deri ved from the 
literature. In fact, the onl y differences are th at (a) the literature does not make a 
conceptual comparison of abusive and predatory lending; and (b) parti cipants did not 
make an explicit separation of prime and subprime lending. 
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All Lend ing 
Figure 5. Relationship of fraudul ent lending to other types of lending. 
As introd uced in chap ter two of th is research, the majo rity of preda tory mo rt gage 
lending occurs in the subprime market though there are also occas ional instances in the 
prime market. Mo rtgage fraud also occurs in both markets though the majo rity of fraud 
that harms borrowers occurs in the subprime market. These ideas were also support ed by 
the participants. Unlike the literatu re however, parti cipants also defined abus ive lending 
as inclusive of all predatory lending. Figure 6 combines the ideas found in the lit erature 
and the interviews. 
The Ter111 "Predmor)l Lendiug" 
Whi le the majori ty of the 12 parti cipants agreed wi th nature of the relat ionships of 
terms dep icted in figu re six, there were a few dissent ing opinions. Even though many 
participants used the terms more or less interchangeably, some did not explicitly see them 
as the ame. For example, referring to abusive and predatory lending, one lender said, " I 
wo uld say they arc two different factors. " 
Subprime 
Ma rket 
Prime 
Market 
Figure 6. Relationships of market clements based on participants and the literature. 
Though these few dissenting opini ons may seem to inva lidate the accuracy of 
Figure 6, further evidence supports the idea that Figure 6 is in fact correct , and that 
di sc repancies actually originate through the misunderstanding oftem1s. For example, 
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one parti cipant who is invol ved in regulation. ex plained that the term predato ry lending in 
particular, can have widely varying meanings from one person to the nex t, and is heav il y 
innucnccd by one ' s background . In ot her words, it is likely that lack of parti c ipant 
unanimity in the findings depicted in Figure 6 stem fro m incomplete or biased 
info rmation rather than true di sc repancy. Thi s was further validated by interchangea bl e 
nature o f the terms as used by the partici pant s. 
'·Predatory lending" is a catchy term, and this perhaps is the reason for its 
continued usage, but it has ev identl y taken on a wider meaning than was originally 
intended. When speak ing of predatory lending, the majority of parti cipants ne ither 
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confined themselves to acts of predat ion, nor did they necessaril y portray lenders as the 
perpetra tors. They did not confine themselves to descriptions of unethical acts; they also 
described illega l or fraudul ent acti vities as being predatory. ln other words, the term 
predatory lending se rves as more of a catch-a ll for all types of unfair, home-based 
lending practi ces rather than as a narTO\\ ly defin ed term . On the inadequacy of the term 
preda tory lending one branch manager vented: 
I don't li ke the term predatory lending. There's something about that term that 
rea ll y bothers me as a lender. But I don't know a better term for it. And that's 
the term everybody is using, but it's such a broad paintbrush that I wish someone 
would come up with a bcucr definiti on for it, and figure that out. 
In sho rt , the term predatory lending has no inherent meaning in and o f it se lf, but 
rather different meanings are ascribed depending on who is using the term . When 
lenders, borrowers, consumer advocates, leg islators, reporters, and research ers usc the 
term predatory lending it is very likely that they are all referTing to a s li ghtl y different 
concept. According to participants, achievi ng common understanding is more important 
than trying to seule an impossible argument of seman ti cs. Therefore, regard less of what 
spec ific term was used it became apparent that the majority of the parti cipants' comments 
were simpl y re ferri ng to unfair practi ces in the mortgage lending market, and were not 
limited to predatory ac ts, ill egal act s, unethica l ac ts, or those spec ifica ll y in vo lving a 
lender, but was rather al l inclusive as depicted in fi gure seven. 
Because of the inclusive na ture of unfair lending, a definition combines the 
elements fro m the previously establi shed definitions of predatory and abusive lending. 
Therefore, unfair mor1gage lending practi ces arc defined as one or more of the following 
cond itions: (a) a transaction wi thout a liduciary duty or havi ng the borrower's bes t 
Subprime 
Market 
Fig11re 7. Unfai r lending. 
UNFA IR 
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Market 
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interest in mind, (b) a transacti on the borrower does not completely understand for any 
reason including age, language barrier or lack of financial savvy, (c) a transaction that has 
no beneficial use or results in harm to the borrower, (d) a loan that de li vers the lender 
excessive profits, and (e) a loan that the borrower does not have the abi lity to repa y. 
As further evidence wil l suggest, thi s defi nition is more detailed and 
encompass ing than the defi nition given in the 2000 HUD/Treasury report (seep. 4), and 
for purposes of conceptual understanding, th is de(ini ti on provides a much more use ful 
starting point, specificall y for Utah (U.S. Department of Housing, 2000). Yet, aga in thi s 
definition is not intrinsically useful for constructing remedies to the problem because of 
vague genera li zations and the lack of measurability. Though discouraging these 
shortcomings are not surprising given that previous studies have encountered similar 
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prob lems (Specia l Comm ittee on Aging, 2004; Stei n, 200 I; U.S. Department of Housing, 
2000). With each fw1her study on the topic it has become apparent that measurable 
definition of predatory mortgage lending is unattainab le. In anticipation th is lack of 
measurabil ity, objec tives two through six were also inc luded in th is stud y so th at specific 
detail s and measurability might be achi eved thro ugh thi s st ud y. The remaining sec tions of 
thi s chapter consist of additional comments made by the 12 mortgage lending experts and 
arc intended to supplement this newl y formed definition by offering a more specific, 
applicable, and measurable understanding of unfair lend ing practices in Utah. 
Research Objective Two: The Magnitude of Unfair Lendi ng 
Sources named spec ific places in Utah that had experi enced un fa ir lending 
practices inc ludi ng St. George, the west side of Sa lt Lake Valley, West Va ll ey City, 
Ogden, and Sandy. One person also implicated the entire Wasatch Front as more or less 
a hotbed or unfair lending ac ti1 ity. 
One neutral participant and one industry advocate explained that they felt the 
problem was minimal, while another industry advocate felt that it was more of a 
moderate problem. Yet , the majorit y of the parti cipants of th is st udy explai ned that unfa ir 
lending was a large and inc reas ing prob lem by relati ng quotes simi lar to these made by 
two consumer advocates, " It is signifi cant , pmbably makes up 5-10% of the new loan 
originations," and," . .. it's just a huge problem." 
Many of the partici pan ts cons idered foreclosure, bankruptcy and default rates as 
additional indicators of unfair lending practices. A family finance ex pert ex plained thi s 
\iew: 
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If you look at Utah 's default rates, bankruptcy rates, I wo uld say it ' s pretty high 
because they all correlate. All of it plays in ... the bankruptcies, the defaults, all 
of that ti e into it all together. 
Research Objective Three: Vic tim Charac teri stics 
Most often the term victim is synonymous with the term borrower. As di sc ussed 
in the first section of thi s chapter, thi s is not always the case because there are instances 
in which a person or entity other than the borrower becomes a vict im, or in wh ich the 
borrower who was originally a co-conspirator later becomes a secondary victim. 
Descript ions of the characteristics o f all three types of victims were shared by the 
offi cials. 
Th e Co-conspimtor 
One partic ipant who dea ls ex tensively wi th cases of mortgage fraud explained 
that borrowers often act as co-conspirators in attempts to defraud a lender. The co-
conspi rator is often a single minority female with good credit who has a trusting 
relati onship with the dishonest broker. This expert explained that even the borrower, 
though a pa rt y to the fraud , often becomes a seconda ry victi m: 
The area where I see it, primari ly mort gage brokers, that have enough know ledge 
of certain loan products, and they have a certai n knowledge of the way the 
industry functions that they know where there is wiggle room, and so they 
cap ita li ze on it. And they seek out a victim who is also a party to the fraud , and 
then they sort of exp loit them ... and the person goes along with it .. . and even 
though they've seen certain red nags go up, they st ill keep goi ng for the bait , and 
then after the dea ls closed and the house of cards falls on them, then they know 
they' ve been had. 
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Thus the borrower is sometimes taken advantage of in cases of fraud and , and in 
other cases is a full accomplice. The d istinction depends on how much the borrower 
knows. and can sometimes be diffi cult to determine. 
N 011 - h OJ T OIVer s 
Cases of fraud usuall y target, as the primary victim, the sources of fund s such as a 
lender, the secondary market, or investors in genera l. A participant wi th over 40 yea rs of 
experience in the homebuying market ex pl ained: 
In Utah, what we are talking about is that the victim is usuall y the lender; some 
rogue professional in a mortgage broker company has staged innatcd pri ces and 
go t a loan .... More investi gations center around the lender, the bank, the 
wholesaler. They are the ones who are duped. They are th e ones who think they 
are holding an 80% loan but in realit y it 's a 140% loan. 
Th is expert expla ined that ultimately those who invest in mutual fund s and other 
companies that hold the values of those mortgages through the secondary market suffer 
because o r unfair and fraudulent loans: 
The other victim is gray haired people like me who 's 401(k) re li ed on a money 
market manager managing my 40 I (k). He's very good at crunching yie ld rates of 
return but he thinks the apprai er, the mortgage broker, the real estate agent , he 
thinks the system already did the ri sk analys is for him, but they didn ' t. He was 
foo led. The system brok e down . 
Th is leads to a lower rate of return than investors should ri ghtfully receive. On 
the surface th is may appear to be onl y a minor problem, though for individuals who use 
these investment vehicles for retirement sav ings the di sparity could ultimately result in 
the loss of hundreds of thousands of do ll ars o f retirement income. 
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13ori·0\\ 1el·s 
Though the losses to the industry and to investors caused by unfair lending can be 
substantial on the who le, they rare ly have th e same devastati ng impacts that arc often 
incurred by indi vi dual borTowers. Borrowers are not as dive rsifi ed as in ves tors usuall y 
arc, and they cannot pass on the costs to custom ers as the industry can. A borrower can 
suffer life altering losses due to unfair lending, and this is why they rece ive so much 
attention. There are cer1ain characteristi cs that seem to make a borrower more vulnerable 
to un fa ir lending practices. The characteri sti cs of borrowers as described by the officials 
can be characteri zed as (a) their personal attributes, (b) their emotional state, (c) their 
finan cial characteristics, and (d) their general ab ility to understand home loan 
transactions. 
Personal allributes. Victims are li kely to either be very yo un g, or ve ry old , and 
of minorit y status acco rding to participants. One homebuying counselor described 
severa l experi ences of working wi th very yo ung couples who sometimes were not yet 
even married but were trying to arrange financing for a home. Older ad ults seem to be a 
more popular target, especially for refinancing or equity based loans due to built up 
equ ity th at has been accumul ated over a lifetime. Older adults are sometimes 
increasingly vulnerable due to loss of former capaciti es, as seen in an example shared by 
a neutral pa rticipant: 
But they can also be people who once were very sharp but they are elderl y and 
they have slowed down ... that happens to someone who was an attorney or a 
CEO of a company, that they've been retired for 20 or 30 years and they are a 
little slow, yet they are too proud or too embarrassed when they even think that its 
go ing south to say anything until it s too late. 
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Minority group members also tend to be victimized disproportionately, though 
most intcrvie" ees ci ted language barriers as the rea l cause of vulnerabilit y. The language 
barri er can prevent a minority indi vidual from doing adequate shopping, and may lead to 
agreements with the first person they fee l they can trust, whether of not their rates are 
competiti ve. Many times thi s leads to instances of lending canniba lism, which in vo lves a 
lender or broker of the same ethnic background tak ing advan tage of minority borrowers 
because of assumed trust and lack of op ti ons. 
Though minorities may have a somewhat legitimate reason for not pursuing other 
borrowing options, they are not the only ones who fai l to shop and price compare before 
entering a loan . Vict ims arc sometimes thought to be somewhat irresponsible when it 
comes to protect ing themselves, parti cularly by not taking the initiative to shop arou nd 
fo r good deals. Sti ll , others attrib ute thi s failure to shop aro und not to a lack of 
rcspon ibili ty, but rather to an overl y trusting attitude. Officials indicated that Utah 
borro\\ ers are overl y trusting especially when it comes to mortgage lending because as a 
homcbuying counselor explained, ··Peopl e put a lot of trust into those professionals." 
Several participants ex plained that there are so many di verse characteristi cs that 
could make someone more susceptible to unfa ir loans that it is perfectly reasonable to 
ass ume that anyone could potentia ll y be a victim. One neutral parti cipant summarized by 
saying, "Minority groups, seni ors, low- income, and actuall y, it can be anybody." 
Em01ional characlerislics of borrowers. Emotional characteristi cs also play a key 
role in borrower vulnerabi lity. Pee lings of desperation are common emoti ons and can 
stem from excess ive debt. Mortgage debts are perhaps the most pressing; miss ing onl y 
one or two payments can send the borrower into a panic to avoid forec losure, which can 
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lead to ac ts o f desperati on. Borrowers in these precarious situations arc apt to be more 
recepti ve to loan solicitations, as one lender explained: 
You get a little bit desperate and for instance ... I'm down maybe two mortgage 
payments, and the mortgage compan y keeps ca ll ing me and they' re sending me 
these letters and telling me I' m going to get foreclosed on, and then all of the 
sudden I get a ca ll from a telcmarkctcr or from a mortgage broker who says, 
" Hey. we can take care of yo ur probl ems," and then emo ti onally, I think J' mmore 
willi ng to take care of the immediate problems, and not think of the long- term 
consequences that thi s high interest rate loan is going to ha ve on me. 
Additionall y, peer pressure seems to play a large role in borrowers overstepping 
thei r bounds. Thi s may not even be ex plici t pressure to keep up with fri ends but may 
start as a subconscious thought when they see thei r fri ends entering homes, and they 
reali ze that the same opportunity may be availabl e to them, as ex pl ained by a housing 
counselor: 
Their fri ends are getting homes. They heard somebody got into the down 
payment program , and they came, and they weren't even thinking about buying a 
home until they hea rd their friends had one, and their friends say, " Hey, go ahead 
and get one too." 
The need for instant credit or for instant gratifi cation was al so o ffered as an 
emotional stimulant. A financial counselor related an instance in which a cli ent had just 
come out o f bankruptcy, and in spite o f her destroyed credit she immediately entered the 
homcbuyin g mark et. The educator ex pl ained that thi s clien t was not deterred at all by 
high interes t rates, she just wa nted a house immediately, in spite of any long-term 
consequences . Even the initial consequences were quite severe as she entered I 00% 
fi nancing, the first 80% at double the prime rate and the last 20% at quadrup le the prime 
rate. It is little wonder thi s cli ent was previous ly invo lved in bankruptcy; she seemed 
addicted to the emotional joys of instant credi t. 
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Financial clwraCleristics of harrowers. Financial characteristics of borrowers 
also play a role in a borrower's susceptibility to unfair lending practices. A financial 
ed uca tor ex plained that in addition to the instant credit mentality described above, people 
seem to lack the financial skill s even to manage cred it or to rehabilitate damaged credit. 
Ot her financial characteri st ics th at contribute to vulnerability include a lack of sav ings, 
low- or moderate-income status, and , of course, those wi th large amounts of equity in 
their homes such as elderly ad ults di sc us ed previously. But as an education coordinator 
explained, ··[What is important is] not just (bei ng] educated as far as everyday literacy, 
but financial education." Even very bright and we ll ed ucated people have become 
victims simpl y because their financial skill s are inadequate. 
Genera/understanding of tile 1110rtgage 111arket. Overa ll, Uta hns lack fin ancial 
lit eracy. and even a general understanding of the mortgage market. Many, especially 
first-time home buyers, enter the mortgage market opti mistica ll y but lack the ex peri ence 
and education to undertake the complex ities involved in a home loan transac ti on. One 
participant involved in regulation illustrated : 
The people who [arc ex ploi ted arc] ... the unsophisti cated consumers who 
orh erwise are nor in a position to protect themselves, either because they arc 
unsophisticated or not kno wledgeabl e about how the market wo rk s, or what they 
may be getting themselves into. And thai may be because of ... the level of 
ed ucation or experience that person has. 
Even those who feel they are ready to under1ake a home loan transaction can find 
themselves lost in inches of paper wo rk , much of it comprised of legal di sc losures that 
are designed to protect the consumer. The more paperwork there is, the less likely it is to 
be read, explained a regional lending manager who went on to say, .. 1 would dare say a 
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\Cry \'Cry small percentage of the population understand what they arc signing. and 
understand the terms of their Joan." 
Research Objective Four: Factors that Foster Unfair Lending 
Participants described that the litctors and conditions that have led to the ex istence 
of unfair lending practi ces stem from three basic areas: industry conditions, pub li c 
f>lc tors, and legal structure. Each of these facto rs is exam ined individually, and then 
overlapping factors are discussed. 
lndusll:r Facrors 
Market co111plexirJ· Mark et compl ex it y was one of the most cit ed factors for 
the ex istence of unfair lending. The mortgage lending market is very complex and as a 
conseq uence borrowers sometimes have a tough time di scerning the terms of their loans. 
One consumer advocate described that mortgages and real estate transactions virtua ll y 
have their own languages, meaning that discussing mortgages and real estate can invol ve 
technical and ind ustry spec ific terms th at borrowers may fail to grasp. Especiall y when 
reading the req uired di sc losures, borrowers have sometimes been known to read through 
entire disc losures and still enter into unfair loans because they simpl y do not understand 
them. Compl ex ity of di sc losures is great ly compounded by the quantity of di sc losures 
that are assoc iated wi th a single loan. In terestingly, the following comment came from 
one of the part icipants who is also an attorney: 
There are so many of them that di sc losures are becoming meani ngless. I heard 
somebody say, and I don ' t know this as a fac t, but when you close on a mor1gage, 
if yo u actuall y read every document that is prepared in connecti on with that 
mortgage, it would take something like I 0 hours. And the las t time I got a home 
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mon !Sage Joan we were in the clo ing fo r about45 minutes. So it was j ust one 
doc ument aft er another bei ng laid in front of me and signing it, and I a lmost got 
writers cramp. And those documems were full of di sc losures and I paid no 
allellli on to them at all. 
/JoouJing housing n1arke1. Additi onal factors con tributing to the ex istence of 
unfair lendin g inc lude the fai rl y recen t market booms, and the swelling numbers of 
lenders trying to make their way in the market. Some of these lenders have become bad 
ac tors5 who s impl y use the mor1gage lending market as a tool for exercising their 
craft iness and greed, explained one regulator who shared, " It 's just the dri ve for the 
alm ight y do llar. It's see ing an opponuni ty to make some money, and they arc willing to 
bend the law as they see it , break the law, forfeit their ethi cs, in order to make money." 
The 11Wrke1 system. St ill others do not blame the lenders as much as they do the 
structure of the mortgage lending sys tem. They explain that it operates incorrectly, or 
that lenders and other actors have misplaced incenti ves and are more or less forced to be 
un fa ir in order to stay in business. An allorncy explained, ""The system is set up to 
incenti vise people to do the most loans they can do. The whole system is setup on 
vo lume and I think that maybe pushes people to, in one way or another, be more greedy." 
Parti c ipants al so ex pl ained that the system naws origi nate with in vestors, also 
known as the secondary mark et, through whi ch actors are often rewarded financia ll y for 
arranging very ri sky loans, even when those loans have no logica l benefit to the 
borrower. 
\ The tt'rm "bad actor .. ,,·as used by the U.S. Departmem of Treasury (2000) and o ther literature, as well as 
by participants in this study to desc ribe all p~.:qJe t rators in unfa ir loans, not just lenders. This could include 
nppra iscrs. brokers, loan officers, rea l es tate agents. and any other party that ac ts as a perpetrator of unffl ir 
lending actions. 
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Factors Related to the General Public 
The ex perts di sc ussed many factors re lat ed to the nature of the public, or 
borrowers collect ive ly, that fo ste r the ex istence o f unfair loans. A large in nux of 
minoriti es wi th a lang ua ge barri er, increasing popularity of instant c redit, a lack of 
com munity reso urces for borro wers, a huge push for homeow nership for all, and th e 
tru st ing nature of Utah borrowers, were all reasons c ited why the publi c is so vuln erable 
to un fa ir lending practices. The c lea r majority of comments concerning publi c 
vuln erabilit y actuall y concerned th e gene ral leve l of awareness. W hen asked about 
ed ucat ional opport uniti es for pote ntial borrowers one finance ed ucator co nveyed, " The 
education is the re ... I think it 's ava ilable, it 's just people knowing. Knowing, not just 
that it 's th ere, but also knowing the va lu e of it is huge." 
Additiona l public factors that the participants we re concerned w ith were th e hi gh 
rates of fo reclosure and default , whi ch not on ly lead to a press ing need to re finan ce, but 
also lead to ta rni shed credit hi stori es, leav in g fewe r options and high er rates for these 
homeowners w hen it co mes tim e to refinance . 
Legal Factors 
For the most part , participants also agreed that th e legal system was at least 
parti a ll y to blame for condit ions that allowed unfair lendi ng practices to occur. Yet there 
was littl e agreement on what exactl y was wro ng with th e system. Approx imately half of 
the parti c ipants c laimed that the lega l system was too re lax ed, espec ia ll y w ith usury rates 
and caps. The other half, however, felt differe ntl y, that there were too many laws, or that 
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laws were too complex to be useful, such as the case wi th the nu mbers of disc losures 
described above. 
Accoulllabilily. With current laws it is often Li mes diffi cult to hold market 
ac tors acco untable for their actions, whether good, or bad. The majo rit y of the 
part icipants fe lt that licensing of market actors was a beller approach for increasing 
accoun tabi lity than Jaws that spec ifica ll y rest ric t practi ces or behaviors. In addition to 
licensi ng, participants believed that the problem is not that current legis lat ion is 
inadeq uate, but rat her, that the currcnL Jaws are not adequately enforced. The former 
owner of a lendi ng fi rm explained, ·'Utah is a state that just doesn' t seem to have, we ll we 
have laws. and they are already on the books, they just don ' t seem to have any real teeth 
in the Jaws." 
This lender continued, " I thin k that the Di vision of Real Esta te docs a good job 
wi th the few resources that arc avai lable 10 them." Additional comments support ed thi s 
idea that the state's regul atory agencies do as much as poss ible but si mply Jack suffi cient 
resources to effec ti vely monito r lending act ivit y in the state. Also vo iced by parti cipants 
is the idea that the current Jaws may be adequate, but the penalties fo r violat ions of these 
laws arc not. On pena lti es that are currentl y on the books, a lender desc ribed: 
The onl y thing yo u could do is spank the realtor on the hand , and slap him with a 
$5 00 fi ne, whi ch I believe is the max imum , or at least it was when I wo rked there. 
And [for] the appraiser [it] would be $ 1000 and the max imum you could gel out 
of a lender would be $2500. 
Borrowers can lose lens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars, and even their 
homes, as a result of bad loans. Simi larly, market ac tors are sometimes able to fin agle 
tens or hu ndreds of thousands of dollars from a single borrower. The current penalti es as 
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desc ri bed by this lender hard ly seem suffi cient to deter unethical market acti vity among 
ac tors who simp ly see these fees as a cost of do ing business. 
Jurisdicrional houndaries. Penalties do not serve as much of a deterrent to 
would-be perpet rators o f un fa ir lending, bu t in addition, the chances of ever being caught 
in the first place are in reality, quite slim . Thi s is partly due to the structure of the legal 
sys tem, or rather the structure of jurisdi ctional boundari es of the regulatory bodi es 
invo lved in home-based lendi ng. Juri sd icti onal boundari es are perce ived as very 
confus ing and uno rga ni zed, and have been blamed for causing many instances of unfai r 
lending to "s lip thro ugh the cracks." When asked which regulatory body was in charge of 
regu lating second mortgages one neutral parti cipant repli ed: 
It may not Ca ll under anybody's. The Di vision of Real Estate regulates first 
res ident ia l mort gages by nondepos itori es. If they do commercial loans [the 
Division] doesn' t regulate it, if' they do second mortgages [the Di vision] doesn' t 
regulate it. Yo u get something like the loan fraud that we saw a few years ago 
with Fairbanks Capital , [the Division] didn 't regul ate that because they don ' t 
regulate se rvicers. That comes under the Department of Financial Instituti ons. 
When I say they don ' t regul ate it , I don ' t want yo u to get the impress ion that 
that's something that they choose, but that by statute, it 's not given to them to 
regulate. 
One part ic ipant desc ribed instances in which several industry actors were not even aware 
of which governing body regul ated their parti cul ar areas of busi ness. Table 4 was 
deve loped by one of the participants during an interview to describe the eli vision of 
regulati on and the types of lenders and the impacts of thi s structure of orga ni zation. 
Though thi s table explains the di vision of juri sdi ction a bit more clearl y, it does 
not adequately descri be who regu lates second-mortgage lenders, home remodeling 
fi nancers, home eq uity lenders or others who do not fa ll directly into the ca tegori es of 
GO 
Table 4 
Division of Regu!arion and !he Types of Lenders 
Regulated by: Department of Financial Division of Real Estate 
lnsti tutions 
Cla ssi !ications · Depositori es Nondepositories 
(Banks. Cred it Unions or 
affiliate) 
Mortgage Banker Larger banks such as We ll s Closes loans in their own name and 
(Owns the Fargo and Zions. then se ll s them off to the secondary 
mortgage note) Most regulated group. market. 
Has regular audits . (Least amount of predatory 
loans) 
Mortgage Broker May be a small comm unity Never owns the paper and doesn't 
(Never owns the bank that does not hold have deposits. 
mortgage note) loans in the ir own Least regu lated group of all. 
Does not have regular portfolio. (Most predatory loans) audits. 
depository and non depository. Several parti cipants emphasi zed that the issue was not a 
de fi ciency in the abilities of the state's cu rrent regulatory bodies, but rather a lack of 
adequately defined areas of regulation. The ex perts explained that in jurisdictional issues 
the state has little control because the divisions of authority are often passed down from 
the federal leve l. This concept was ex plained by a participant with over 20 years 
experience in the market: 
They actually attempted to do uni versa l li cens ing in Utah. The federal ly 
cha rtered depository institutions said, "Hey, do what yo u want License away! We 
are a federa ll y chartered bank, we're subj ect to federal laws, and so i fyou pass all 
this licensi ng stuff' we're go ing to claim federa l preemption. So put al l the 
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restrictions that yo u want on yourse lves, we're going to be exempt because we're 
federa ll y chartered." Thi s is one of the reasons for the division of regulation of 
mort gage lenders in this state between the Division of Real Estate for 
nondeposi tori es and the Department of Financial Institutions for depositories. 
01•er/apping Factors 
Some of the factors discussed by the part icipants seemed to have an overl apping 
nature, or had an inOuence over more than one of the previously desc ri bed areas. For 
example, according to several participan ts, the lack of accountability in both the industry 
and the pub lic have led to condit ions that foster greater unfair lending acti vity. ··There is 
responsib ility on both sides," one ed uca tor adm itted. Ignorance on the part of con umcrs 
and greed on the part of the lenders too o ft en goes unchecked, and that combinati on of 
cond iti ons has led to most occurrences of unfair lending, acco rding to one lender. 
Ohstacles to victim redress. Parti cipants also felt that there were many obstac les 
that prevented consumers li·om receiving adequa te redress once they had been victimized. 
This can be seen as a legal problem or a consumer awareness problem depending on the 
si tuation. Accord ing to a regulator awareness of avenues for redress is an issue, "They 
may not know that they can or where to go." This certainl y makes sense considering the 
ju ri sdi cti ona l issues di scussed previously. If some industry actors are not even aware of 
what regulatory body has juri sdi ct ion over th em, it stands to reason that a borrower 
wou ld lind it difficult , if not imposs ible, to lodge an official comp laint aga inst such a 
compan y. 
Even those who do manage to lodge complaints rarely see effect ive results 
according to a consumer advocate who said,·' o everyone asks me, ·Well why bother 
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go ing through all thi s'l Why give you all my information and talk to yo u when yo u can't 
fi x it?' And you can't, you can' t fi x it. Very rarely. And that 's been my ex peri ence." 
Lack of resources for prevention and repamtion. The lack of resources can be 
viewed as a lega l or a consumer issue. Lack of reso urces is indeed an obstacle for 
regulatory bodies as discussed prev iously. Beyond legal resources, educators and 
consumer advocates also lack resources spec ifically for prevention of, and reparations 
from unfair lending. On preventative measures one educator ex plained, ' 'The problem is 
fu nding. If we had enough fund ing we could offer these c lasses for free and attrac t a lot 
more peo pl e to come." As far as recove1·i ng losses from instances of unfa ir lending, 
parti cipants explai ned that it usually requires the services of an atto rney, but the costs of 
these services can eas ily ou tweigh the potential benefi ts, as one atto rney explained," ... is 
it worth go ing after them'l . . An attomey who has to ea rn a fee off of[ the case] is not 
likely to sue them." But it is c lear that whether it be for consumer education or for 
tracking clown and prosecuting bad actors, there are just not enough resources available 
for prevention of and reparations from cases of unfair lending. 
Pressure to arrange bad loans. Large amounts of pressure and emotion on both 
sides leads industry actors and consumers to a1-range loans that are not economica ll y 
logica l. An owner of a lendi ng finn exp lained that lenders face pressure from all 
cl i ffcren t areas : 
Someti mes I think pressure is self-imposed by a loan officer that' s making a loan. 
Perhaps they've told people all along, "Hey, th is loan looks good, no problem'' 
And some kind or a probl em comes up toward the time a clos ing is app roaching 
and people have literal ly boxed up their house, and have moving vans go ing and 
all of the sudden there's a probl em. 
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Lenders can face self imposed pressure, to earn profits or simp ly to sati sfy the 
borrower. Borrowers can also be very emotionally charged for many reasons, but often a 
primary reason is simply the magn itude of the financ ial transaction . The lender explains: 
For most peopl e it' s the largest financia l transacti on they've ever made, so there 
can be a lot of emotions that come into play. And people sometimes act in ways 
they wouldn'tnormall y act because of the pressures in vo lved with dead li nes, 
money involved, and all those kinds of" things. 
Lock of measurement standards. Pressure and emotion on both sides of the 
transaction can create prime conditions for the arrangement of"'economically illogical 
loans." a neutral participant observed. The lack of a consistent and accurate 
measurement standard has made it imposs ible to identify what consti tutes an 
economi ca ll y illogical loan. Thi s is yet another factor that has allowed unfair lending to 
persist, because occurrences can and often do remain undetected by all parti es including 
borrowers. lenders and even legal enforcers until it is too late. Due to thi s lack of 
standard measurement , unfair lending is currently treated on a "case-by-case basis," 
described a directing member of a national lend ing finn. 
Summar)" ofOhjective Four 
There were four genera l catego ri es fo r the facto rs and conditions that fos tered the 
ex istence ofu nl"a ir lend ing in Utah: industry, public, lega l, and overl app ing fac tors. 
Participants in dicated that iJTesponsibility and lack of accountability pers ists on both 
sides of transactions. Panicipants also ex plained that the mortgage lendi ng market is 
comp lex and vast, and lenders and borrowers alike often face connicting incenti ves, due 
to curren t market structure. Additionally there are serious jurisdictional issues and 
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certain types of lending occur without any go' ernment regulation, leadi ng to many 
eli ffi culties includi ng lack of adeq uate victim redress. 
Research Object ive Five: Practices 
In the fo llowing story related by a lending counse lor, there are roughl y seven 
pract ices mentioned that have been de fi ned by one or more in terview parti c ipants as 
unfair lending prac ti ces: 
l ' lltell yo u a story. In rura l Utah there was a fam ily that was qua lifi ed fo r a loan 
that was way more than they cou ld afford, and ... just pushing those ratios to the 
max .... It was a ba ll oon payment. Knowi ng that it could not succeed, the lender 
put them in it anyway .... It was adj ustable rate which is fin e under cert ain 
circumstances, but with a lender who knows that they've alread y stretched the 
rati os as far as they can . .. And then, the second that rat e goes up , they are just 
go ing to bt-cak the famil y. And then putting that prepayment pena lty so there's no 
way they can get out. You al so sec that realtor-lender group .. .. that they put 
yo u in hoping that it will fitil so th at they can buy the house and rese ll it to 
somebody else who can fitil , and make tons of money on both ends o f it. 
In general. unfa ir mortgage lending practices that result in a negat ive effect on a 
borrower can be divided into t\\ o di stinct ca tegories : un fair actions on the pa rt of bad 
ac tors, and un fa ir loan fea tu res. Before introdu~i n g the rest of thi s section a point that 
can not be overemphas ized, and with which most parti cipant s agreed, is that many of 
these acti ons or features do not, by themselves, necessaril y make a loan predatory, 
abusive or unfair. It is the case, however, that each of the practices or loan features 
discussed in thi s sec ti on has at one poin t been used, and has been at least partiall y to 
blame fo r an occurrence of unfair lending. Each unfa ir action and loan fea tu re is 
discu sed " ith supporting ev idence offered bv the experts. 
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Unjitir Actions 
I 00% financing. One industry advocate, one consumer advocate and one neutral 
part icipant described that I 00% financing can be a good thing, and is often directl y 
support ed by government sponsored or non-profit consumer agencies. Yet, they fee l that 
it is o l"tcn mi sused, espec ia ll y when arranged direc tl y by lenders. The first 80% is o11 en 
several points above the prime rate. which isn't necessari ly harmful , but the last 20% will 
o ft en be financed at a 20% interest rate or even higher. Acco rd ing to these participants, 
thi s creates a harmful situ3tion "ith the borrower li ving in an unaffordable house with 
unaflo rdab lc payments. 
J-.l'ear C}>c/e oflooll officer employtllel/t. One participant wit h ex tensive 
ex perience in the banking industry ex plai ned what she ca ll ed, a "3-year cyc le." The 3-
yea r cyc le entai Is dea ling with a loan officer who att empts to evade internal audi ts that 
are conducted regularl y by deposito ry institutions. This person offers hi gh priced and 
abus ive loans. and after about 3 years the loans made by th is officer wi ll start fai li ng and 
goi ng into foreclosu re. By thi s time, however, the loan officer has moved to another 
company and started the process all over agai n. The new company is not aware o f the 
behav ior of these offi cers; in fact, when they hired him and talked to Human Resources at 
his former compan y, he was o ft en characterized as one of their top producers. Th is 
eventuall y leaves the borrowers and the banks" ith the bad loans, while the officer is free 
to continue ea rn ing large commissions. 
Bait and switch. Bait and switch practices were on ly exp licit ly discussed by one 
consu mer ed ucator, though it was implied by many other parti cipants. Bait and switch 
practi ces in vo lve luring in borrowers with promises of low rates and fees, so metimes 
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even on wrillcn good faith estimates, but changing all of those figures to hi gher rates at 
the time of clos ing. Many borrowers arc o emoti onal ly in vo lved and under pressure at 
the time of clos ing that they wi ll sign the documen ts anyway. The educator ad milled that 
borrowers need to be more responsibl e, and not to sign under those circumstances, but 
that many borrowers are just not aware of the ir ri ghts in those types of s ituati ons, and arc 
sometimes threatened and pressured into signing. 
Lending cannibalism. Lending canniba li sm captures the idea that minoriti es use 
their commonalities such as language and cu lture to prey on borrowers of their own 
ethnic background. Two consumer advoca tes and one neutral parti cipant ex pl ained that 
thi s is a common occurrence. The neutral partic ipant ex plained: 
I've seen Hi span ics taking ad va ntage of Hi span ics. That seems to be the biggest 
nati onal origin group that's do ing that. It will be a Hispan ic rea ltor, Hi spanic 
lender, and sometimes even the insurance company, are all in cahoots together, or 
have one company that they go to and they package the whole dea l. 
Criminal condllcl. Crimina l conduct. explained an attorney, can range from 
complete fra ud, to fai lure to disclose proper terms, or failu re to give a good faith 
estimate. A neutral participant ex plained that these act ivities are ill ega l and are certainl y 
unfair, and harm fu l. 
Etj llit\ · hased lending. Two consumer advocates and three neutral parti cipants 
ex plained that equity based lending is quite common. Thi s includes qualifying a 
borrower for a loan based on eq uit y and not income. Equity based lend ing can also 
invo lve equity stripping through repeated refi nanci ng, and often happens to elderly adults 
because they usuall y have large amounts of equity that has been built up over the yea rs. 
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Misleading information. Two ind us try advocates, two consumer advocates, and 
one neutral parti cipant di scussed mi slead ing information as being particularly harm ful. A 
neutral participant explained that thi s is a gray area but is certainl y harm ful : 
To mislead somebody about what those terms are, wo uld agai n, wi th the intent to 
get them in to a loan that if they rea ll y understood those tem1s, a reasonable person 
... wo uld not enter the transact ion. 
Scheme to steal from borrowers. Two neutral part icipants explained that many 
ti mes ac tors arc not rea ll y in business to make money legiti mately but are s imply using 
lending as a means to stea l. One shared : 
But the rea l predators are the ones that not only sel l a package that is not good for 
you, but they sell you a package and then rol l it two or th ree times to the point 
tha t the fees have been jacked so hi gh, that they intend to reall y stea l the property. 
That 's a real predatory thi ng. 
Mullij>le salarv qualification. One consumer counselor ex plained that she sees 
many loans that were arranged based on multiple sa lari es, or using the combi ned income 
of all residents in the household . Sometimes the income of a tempora ril y residing 
relati ve is inc luded. Thi s can be harmfu l as she explains: 
But when one guy moves out , they don ' t have enough money an y more, and there 
arc j ust too many people on the Joan, too many sa lari es being considered, which is 
rea lly go ing on here a lot. Every minorit y that comes in for default counseling 
has a [m ulti ple sa lary) Joan. 
Flipping. Flipping, discussed by two consumer advocates and one neutral 
parti cipant , is bas ica ll y repeated refin ancing of a home, often with the intent to strip 
equity. The perpetrator will usuall y set the monthly payment amount de liberately hi gh so 
that the borrower cannot make the payments. And when they cannot make the payments, 
they wi ll refinance, and wh ile the monthl y payment might be a little lower, the 
perpet rator wil l make large profit s from the c los ing fees of the original loan and the 
open ing of a new loan. The perpet rator can do this until the equity is en tirely stripped 
and the borrower cannot affo rd the fees to refi nance, leading to forec losure. 
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Abusive servicing. The day to day responsibilities of collecting payments from 
the borrowers are often sold to third party co ll ectors known as loan scrvicc rs. According 
to one consumer advocate and one neutral parti cipant, there are unfair prac ti ces occurTing 
in the servicing market. Servieers have been known to add bogus fees, intentionall y hold 
payments to earn late fees, and to frequentl y lose payments. According to a con umcr 
advocate, servicers require complaints and disputes in writing within 30 days, but do not 
tell the borrowers this, often leav ing the borrower unable to address any prob lem on their 
acco unt. These unfair se rvicing penalti es can add up , as a consumer advocate shared, " I 
just saw one the other day and it was $9,000 more added to their principal." 
Sreering. Steering, acco rding to one participant from each category, is leading a 
customer to a higher cost product than they wou ld rea ll y qualify for. Thi s could invo lve 
actively steering a customer to higher rates. or a subprime lender omitting or hiding from 
a borrower with good credit that they cou ld get a better price with a prime lender. 
Una.!Jordab/e lending. Unaffo rdab le lending, accord ing to a consumer advocate 
is," ... just pushing those ratios to the max." The rat ios referred to include debt -to-
income rati os, and loan-payme nt -to-income ratios. Mortgage lenders often use such 
ratios to determine the cred it ri sk of indi viduals, but ofien push the debt-load and 
monthl y payments as high as poss ible. Thi s can also be facilitated by down payment 
ass istance, or loans from relati ves, "And then it just snowballs from there." Three 
consumer advocates, two industry advocates, and all four neutral participants commented 
that unaffordab le lending is a common unfair lending occurrence. 
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Prel'ing on vulnerabilities. Accordi ng to the neutral participants, two consumer 
advocates, and one industry advocate, un fa ir lending invo lves the act of preying on 
speci fi c charac teri stics of vulnerab le borrowers in order to use one or more o f the li sted 
unfair acti ons or loan featu res to increase profit s. One neutral parti cipant ex plai ned, " It is 
somebody out there who is not looking fo r a typical borrower. They arc look ing for 
someone who is in very ex treme circumstances, so they can take advantage of them." 
!lhusive networking. Two consumer advocates, one industry advocate, and one 
neutral participant explained that ac tors will someti mes network and consistently 
cooperate with the intent of taking advan tage of a borrower. One consumer advocate 
ex plained: 
I always say that, " like" peop le get together. Often the loan officers have " li ke" 
apprai sers and rea l estate agents and they will cont inue to wo rk together through 
the years and through different companies. They become very good at working as 
a team to rip people o ff. 
01 ·emppraising. A key part of ab usive networks is arranging overappraised 
values of propert ies. This creates a real problem when borrowers attempt to refinance or 
sell , and are unable to ac hieve the ori ginal purchase pri ce of the propert y. 
Unfair Loan Features 
Adjustable rate mortgages. Adjustab le rate mortgages (ARM s). like so many 
ac ti ons and loan features , are not inherently un fai r in and of themselves, bu t are often 
misused acco rding to two industry advocate , one consumer advoca te, and one neutral 
part icipant. One lender elucidated: 
For example, and this is a personal bias, because you can talk to people who think 
ARMs are the greatest thing since sli ced bread. But I parti cul arl y have issues 
wi th op tion ARM s. Those are the loans th at yo u've hea rd abo ut on the radio or 
seen on the billboard that advertise a 1.9% interest rate, or something that is 
dramatica lly lower than what the market interest rate is. 
Teaser r(l{e. Simi lar to ARMs, teaser rates are frowned upon by two lenders in 
the stud y. One lender explained hi s views: 
70 
A lot of times they will have a tease1· rate on the front end , and then they' ll ha ve 
negative amorti zation or they' ll have a six month introductory rate. A lborrower 
who is somewhat behind on hi s current loan] is thinking, ''Oh my heck, I've go t to 
get these two payme nts made or my house is goi ng to go," and [the borrower] is 
not thinking abo ut what's goi ng to happen to [him] six months from now. And so 
these guys wi ll suck [hi m] into a teaser rate, and then they' ll whack [him] with a 
higher rate. 
Balloon payments. According to two consumer advocates, one neutral 
part icipant , and one industry advocate, the inclusion of a balloon payment can be very 
harmful beca use it can make the payments in a loan artifi cial ly low and prevent equity 
from acc umulating. One attorney ex plained, 'The ba lloon payment is one way, when 
somebody is struggling along making payments, a ll of the sudden you can lam them 
wi th a ba ll oo n and that 's when yo u can go in and grab the house." 
Credit insurance. Credi t insurance described by one neutral partici pant is usuall y 
not beneficial to the borrower, and is somet imes hidden and financed wi thin the loan, and 
is simpl y ano ther way to earn more profi ts from a borrower. 
Fin(//tcedfees. Credit insurance is not the only charge that is finan ced into a loan; 
if borrowers are unable to pay for fees up front, it is not uncommon to have them roll ed 
up in to the loan. This leads to the long term interest charges not on ly on the loan bu t al so 
on the fees in the loan. One lender in the study saw thi s as particularly unfair. 
1/itl!/en charges. Often the credit insurance and other fees are rolled into the loan 
and the borrower is completely unaware of it. One neutral participant ex plained that thi s 
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practice is unfair and abusive, "And a lot of times, they kind of hide it. You don't even 
know you' re gelling it , and it rea ll y doesn't do much for you, and it can add a good 
I 0,000, S 15.000, or $30,000 into yo ur loan." 
lligi! fees. Two industry advocates and two neutral participants agreed that hi gh 
fees are simply a problem. One neutral part icipant expla ined, " If the interest rate docsn 't 
do the person in, the fees will. It can add anywhere from a couple thousand to S I 0,000 to 
$ 15 ,000 into their loan.' ' 
1/igi! interest rates. High interest rates can be ex tremely detrimental to a 
borrower accon.ling to two neutral participants and two consumer advocates. A neutral 
participant ex plained, "Again, the biggest thing is high interest rates, way above whatever 
the normal ra tes are. Lets say ours arc around fi ve or six right now, they'd be anywhere 
to 8 to 12 to 15, 16, 18 percent.'' 
lllferest only loans. One neutral participant ex plained that interest onl y loans are 
often misused, " Paying interest only, your payment wou ld be lower so you could pay 
more for a bigger home. Peopl e get into houses that are way over their heads. I think 
those should be illega l, but again that 's my op inion." 
Frepoyment penalties. Two lenders, two neutral participants and one consumer 
advoca te ex pla ined that prepayment penalt ies arc frequently mi sused and often prevent 
borrowers from being able to refinance out of the bad loan situation. When other ab uses 
occur in a loan there may be no escape, according to one neutral participant, '"There was a 
prepayment penalty. . so there 's no way they can get out." 
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Research Objecti ve Six: How to Reduce Predatory Lending 
From the previously shared ev idence it is abundantly clear that unfair lending 
practices are widespread, are perpetuated due to numerous factors , in vo lve an inestimab le 
amount of specific practices, can happen to near ly every class of person, and affec t nearly 
everyo ne to some degree. It is also abundantl y clear that because of the comp lex it y of 
the problem. there are no qu ick and easy so lut ions. Therefore, any seri ous ancmptto 
red uce the occ urrence of unfair lendi ng prac ti ces requires a full awareness of all pan ics 
invo lved, a clear understanding of the implicati ons of actions, and a long term 
commitment. The remainder of thi s chapter is devoted to sharing the thoughts and 
opini ons of the 12 mortgage market ex perts on what can and should be done to reduce the 
occurrence of unfa ir lending practices in Utah . 
Legislation 
Prol1ibitive legislation 110 1 effective. A popular sentiment among consumer 
advocates across the nati on is that the majo r naw is a lack of protecti ve legislati on (Engel 
& McCoy, 2002; Quercia et al. , 2004). evcral parti cipants agree that as far as 
prohi biti ve legislation goes, ' 'There could be room for improvement." But most 
parti cipants ei ther ex pli citly or imp licit ly suggested that attempts to legislate unfairness 
out o f the system have not been very effecti ve, and may have even caused more problems 
than it so lved. Several stori es were shared about other states that decided to crack down 
on un fa ir lending with heavy handed legislation, onl y to find that instead of cooperating, 
lenders just pulled out of the state and refused to do business there any longer (Downey, 
2006) . Parti cipants admitted that some of the lenders who left were likely perpetrators of 
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unfair lend in g. but explai ned that the majority were si mpl y serv ing their cl ientele. 
Overly aggressive legis lation can have many adverse consequences, exp lai ned an expert 
on regulatory issues: 
Well , Georg ia for examp le passed an aggress ive predatory lend ing law ... but 
that whole segment of the population was cut off from access to mortgage 
lending ... So you can get into some of thcse areas and rea ll y ha ve a lot of 
unintended consequences that cause a lot more harm than good. And yo u have to 
look for that balance. 
This participant went on to explain that ''What most legislators don't understand 
is they have no control over the financing of mortgages. This is a national market and it's 
controll ed by investors." In other words it may not even be in the hands of the mortgage 
lending companies; if costs of compl ying wi th aggress ive legislat ion arc too high, 
inves tors wil l demand other avenues of in vest in g. In short , it is much too diffic ult to 
separate the unscrupulous lenders from the legit imate lenders based simply on prohibiti ve 
legislati on because, as described in section li ve o f thi s chapter, most act ions and loan 
features are not inherently unfair, they simpl y become unfair when they arc misused. 
While unfair lend ing is certain ly a prob lem "you can't let the tail wag the dog" as one 
participant explained, meaning that legitimate lending should not be hampered in 
attempts to cu rb unfair lending. 
In crease acco!lntahility. A better lega l ap proach, according to the oJfic ials, is to 
increase methods of accountability of market actors, such as licensing for lenders, 
brokers, appraisers, and rea l estate agents. Licensing and registration requirements 
officia ll y began in Utah in early 2004, and one counselor described that "This has made a 
huge difference." Unfortunately li censi ng has not become a panacea. Though li censi ng 
can increase acco untab ilit y, or the ab ilit y to locate perpetrators of unfair lending 
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act ivities, there is usuall y lillie that can be done as a consequence fo r unacceptab le 
practices. A former president of a mortgage company explained : 
All they can do is take their li cense. When they find somebody rea l bad, they take 
their li cense, but they rea ll y ought to be prosecuted . l mean giving up a li cense 
and walking away with '/ , of a milli on dollars in mortgage fraud .. . I'd se ll yo u 
my li cense for Y. of a mil lion do ll ars. lt's jusl a cost of doing business for them. 
Another method ofaccounlabilily thai has been recentl y introduced to the stale of 
Utah for no ndeposi lori es, is the ass ignment of Principle Lending Managers. One lender 
exp lained that each nondepository will be required to have a principle lending manager 
who is responsib le for each person in the company. The idea is to create greater 
incen ti ves fo r companies to police their own employees, and to ensure fair lendi ng 
practi ces. Thi s is generall y seen as a pos iti ve thing among parti cipants. 
There are also cont inuing education requi rements for lenders in Utah. Thi s 
method is al so thought to viewed as a method of increas ing awareness and accountab ility 
acco rding to one lender, "Hopefu ll y, licens ing ori ginators and req uiri ng continuing 
educa ti on, hopefu ll y that helps people be beller at their job." Yet increased 
accountab il ity through licensing, Principle Lending Managers, and continuing education, 
is onl y eflcctive as long as penalti es for un fa ir lending are adequate. Officia ls felt th at 
penalties should be harsher, and therefore more of a deterrent. When asked about 
legislati on, one lender ex plained that the ab ility to enforce ex isting laws is import ant : 
En forcement. Enforcement of the laws th at we already have on the books .... I 
think they ought to be slapped wi th the abso lute maximum fine. You ' ll hit me in 
the pocket book and I might pay anenti onto the rules .... But a $400 fine isn' t 
going to stop me from do ing whatever. 
Geographical /racking. An ed uca ti on center manager suggested a lega l provision 
to all ow regulatory bodies to bener track geographical patterns of indi ca tors of unfair 
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lending, "M ore cogni zant scrutini zation is needed in areas with rapid growth, and with 
more clos ings. These areas are li kely to experi ence higher proportions of abuses. " Thi s 
wo uld help to identify pockets or epidemics of unfair lend ing, which are o ft en 
concent rated in such neighborhoods. 
Improve viCiim redress systems. But, in order for any method of lender 
acco un ta bility o r neighborhood ident ificati on to be effecti ve, consumers certa inly need 
adeq uate avenues fo r redress . As ex plained in the sec ti on on fac tors, even once 
consu mers rea li ze they have been victimi Led they o ften have trou ble ca rryi ng their 
inj usti ces to the nex t step of redress. There are mu ltiple reasons for thi s, (a) borrowers 
arc not aware o f their ri ghts and what they should do to obtain redress, (b) due to 
j urisd icti onal boundari es and lack of awareness, borTowers do not understand where to go 
with concerns and complaints, and (c) even when borTowers manage to fi le appropriate 
complai nts, there is often litt le retri bution that ever comes from it , due to lenient penalties 
at both the state and federal levels. 
MandatO/)' education for harrowers. To avo id ever needing a system of redress, 
severa l part ic ipants argued fo r mandatory counse ling and educati on befo re borrowers are 
ever ab le to enter in to a Joan. Thi s would serve as a preventative measure, and ideall y 
would help the borrowers themselves weed out the more harmful and unethi cal market 
ac tors. A former com munity development lender explained: 
It should be mandatory . . . I can' t stress enough that everybody before they get a 
mortgage should have homebuyer education. Just to know what they' re buying, 
how to fi gure out which mortgage is the best, what interest rates are the best, 
po ints, fees, all the different varieti es of thi ngs that go into acquiring a Joan. Just 
so they have an idea of what the whole process is. 
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Bridge jurisdictional howularies. As described previously, part ic ipants 
cmphasitcd the role that juri sdictional gaps play. Several participants mentioned the 
possib il it y of the creation of special positions for prosecutors who could take lega l act ion 
on cases of mo rt gage fra ud rega rd less of state j urisdictions in vo lved. Howeve r, the best, 
and perhaps onl y way to effec ti ve ly bridge the gap acco rdi ng to so urces, is not action at 
the state level, but rather at the fede ral leve l. One lender sa id , " I think it would be 
reasonab le to do predatory lending laws, bu t in my opinion, they abso lutely have to be 
done on a national level." But whatever legislative action is taken in the future to address 
unfair lending, several participants offered a subtle warning similar to one offered by a 
l · nder, "A nything that is done from the legislati ve side has to be done nat ionally and has 
to be done very cauti ously so yo u do n' t mess up the system th at has served our count ry 
so we ll. " 
Connn1111ity Support 
Com munity support is a vital com ponent in the fight against unfai r len ling. One 
consumer advocate related that word of mouth , and neighborhood support can go a long 
way to increase awareness o f potential borrowers. "Just people in general supporting each 
other," she ex plai ned while also admi tt ing th at thi s is something that is very diffi cult to 
contro l or encourage. 
Fair housing commillees. Other resources that would be very helpful are fair 
housing committees that can act as advocates and resources for victimized borrowers. 
There have been talks of such committees that may have begun to materialize but nothing 
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concrete has yet come forward. One such commiuee that is in the works was described 
by a consum er advocate: 
It 's the Utah Anti-Predatory Lending Initiati ve. It consists of the Beller Business 
Bureau, Community Development Corporation of Utah , America First Credit 
Union, Legal Aid Volu nteers, Eileen Walker housing trust fund, Ut<Jh Mortgage 
Lenders Association, Utah State Uni versity, and AARP vo lunteer corp . Fan nie 
Mae is heading it up. 
The purpose of the committee is not onl y to define the problem but also to crea te 
a comprehensive solution to indi vidual cases. This so lution includes lega l action, 
counseling and education, credit rehabilitation programs, as well as alternati ve financi ng 
opti ons to help the borrower get out of the bad loan as quickly as poss ible. These types 
of groups show potential but require widespread cooperation o f non-profit s and lenders, 
and lmgc amoun ts of fundin g. 
Neighborhood revirali:arion progmms. An additiona l form of consumer 
support can be found in neighborhood revitali zation programs targeted specifically at 
vulnerab le neighborhoods. Some neighborhood revitali zation commillces already ex ist in 
Utah , though on relati ve ly small levels, according to one participant who has had 
ex peri ence work ing with them. In spite of their small size, the participant felt that they 
were very successful at helping rev ita li ze the skills and abi lities of the res id ents in some 
of the most vulnerable neighborhoods on the west side of the Salt Lake Va lley. 
Change lndusny and Borro1ver /ncelllives 
According to the mort gage market expert s, there are two things that wou ld help to 
put correc t incentives in place. For the industry, it is a more vigorous self- po li cing of 
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their own ac tors. For borrowers. it is getting them interested in education for their own 
sakes. 
Rearra11ge i11dus/ly illcelltives. Loan officers and brokers lack an incen ti ve to be 
conce rn ed wit h a customer's long term wel l-being. That is to say, they Jack the financial 
incentive. Participants agree that most mortgage market actors: appraisers, Joan office rs, 
brokers. rea l estate agents. and others, are very honest and ethical peopl e. and that their 
own standa rds of ethics and moralit y arc enough to ensure interest in a customer's long 
term well bei ng. It is not the average actor that becomes an unfair lender, but rather the 
ones who operate strictly on financial incenti ves. Though perhaps sad commentary on 
our society, it is apparent that an increasing amount of bad actors are concerned onl y with 
financial incentives. Parti cipants were not ab le to name specific ways to rea rrange 
incenti ves, but suggested that it is possib le, and worth in vestigating furth er. Perhaps 
larger and more frequent penalties for unfair loans, either derived lega ll y or through the 
indu try itsc l f, or perhaps less up front commissions to brokers and more long term 
rei\ ards for stable loans. would ensure a broker's interest. 
According to one lender, there needs to be more, .. Relationship se lling," and they 
need to be in it , " for the long haul. " One financia l ed ucator explained a relationship 
arrangement in some other states that seemed to help: 
There are states that ha ve a rea ltor-home bu yer educat ion relationship , where, 
when [the realtor) enters into a contract with them he sends them to a home buyer 
class so that they' re educated and then once they get into the process they know 
what they are doing. 
Rearra11ge borrower illcelltives. But lenders and brokers are not the only ones 
who lack incenti ves for long term stabi lity ofloans; borrowers themselves allow, and 
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sometimes even encourage unfair loans just so they can get into an unaffordab lc house. 
More often than not, these situations occur because bon·owers are not fu ll y aware of the 
consequences of such loans, and therefore lack any incenti ve to prevent them. 
Consum er awareness is likely much eas ier to address than changing the incenti ves 
of lenders, yet relati ve ly litt le has been cl one concerning awareness campai gns for 
educating borrowers. So far awareness and educat ion campaigns have been largely 
headed up by non-profit , and grant funded institutions that are too often understaffed, and 
unable to reach the hundreds of thousands of potential borrowers who are in need of their 
services. As one industry advocate announced near the end of the interview, ··consumer 
educat ion is paramount." 
Financial Education 
Since the late eighti es when un fa ir lending practi ces began to proliferate there 
have been people poin ti ng fi ngers at others, and blame and responsibil ity fo r the 
problems cas t in a ll different directions. The industry, for example, has been crit icized 
immensely, and perhaps ri ghtly so because that is the ori gin of the vast majorit y of the 
bad acto rs, and perpetrators. The leg islature has been blamed as being too relaxed or too 
ti ght or not quick enough , and not concerned enough. Aga in there is li kely some truth to 
these statements as we ll. 
Still , the only issue addressed and emphasized by every single part icipant in thi s 
study as an effecti ve method o f reduction is the arrangement of comprehensive fin ancial 
education of every consumer. This method of consumer protec ti on has of course been 
recognized in previous literature but has rarely been accen tuated as the mai n, and best 
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method of consumer protection. Yet, acco rding to part icipants, the importance of thi s 
method of protection cannot be overemphasized. In fac t when one neutral parti cipant 
was asked ncar the end of the stud y what should be done to reduce preda tory lending, she 
simp ly repli ed, "Education, education , education. " 
1/omebuyer education. Homebuying classes are an immediate so lution, and a 
way for consumers to be educated about the process before buying a home. One 
homebuycr counselor asserted ·'Number one is that consumers need to be educated, 
through buyer education courses where predatory lending is covered in detail. " But these 
courses are often limited to a single day, and some fee l that they simpl y need more time 
to trul y educate a borrower. A hous ing spec ialist shared, " I th in k it needs a little more 
time .. . We go fast and hard, and try to get everything in that is go ing to he lp them." 
Ano ther drawback , particu larly to home buyer education , is optimal tim ing of 
courses. Several educators complained that by the time some of the bon·owers were 
involved in the class, they were so deep into the buying process that many would n' t 
cancel the transaction even if they rea li zed it was a bad loan. One homebuyer educator 
ex plained that whenever possible her organ iza tion tri es to catch people before they enter 
the home buying process: 
We would love to have peop le come just because they' re interested in buying a 
home. That's our idea l home buye r student. . because they go in full y armed 
and read y, and once yo u ca ll a predatory lender once or twice on what he's doing, 
he stops. He stops, because he knows you' re educated and he's not goi ng to 
mess with you. 
' ' " 'areness. Borrowers might be more apt to come in fo r the educa ti on if they 
were more aware of it. For most consumers it is an awareness prob lem; not only 
awareness of educational opportunit ies and other resources ava ilable to them, but also 
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awareness of the potent ial dangers or pitfal ls they could encounter as they enter the 
homebuying market. 
Resources. Educators typi cal ly di rect most of their resources to educati on 
materi als, leav ing littl e in the way of adverti sing. An educator described the limits in 
adverti sing: 
Beca use we run on grants, we don ' t use our money for adve rti si ng very much. 
We ' re just now worki ng wi th the city to put it in their cit y newsletters that go out 
with the bi ll s and stuff. And th at 's helpi ng, and every once in a whi le we get a 
free space in the loca l newspaper and we usuall y get a lot of ca ll s on those. 
Formal advet1ising in the media was cit ed by others as an ex tremely e ffec tive 
tooL but was simply too expensive. When asked abo ut resources, several consumer 
ed ucators cited the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (H UD) and 
non-profit foundations. One participant speaking abo ut certain mortgage lending 
compan ies ex plai ned that they had the resources to fu nd "world class fi nancial educa ti on 
co urses," yet very few were cited as direct sources o f fund ing for these institutions. 
However, because the industry also stands to ga in th rough havi ng a "mortgage-ready-
borrower," several participan ts suggest that the mo rtgage lending institutions should be 
required to direct a portion of th ei r funds directl y to these non-profits for purposes of 
education. 
Shopping. Even if consumer educa ti on courses were ful ly funded, and each 
borrower was infom1ed, educated, and prepared to enter the mot·tgage lending mark et, the 
rea l homework would onl y be beginni ng. Consumers need to shop, compare and make 
informed buying decisions. " If consumers would get th ree good fa ith estimates prior to 
en tering into a mortgage, the number of predatory loans would go down significant ly, but 
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they don ' t," explained one allorney. Event hose with bad credi t will have options if they 
rea ll y take the time to shop. Borrowers wi th bad credit can also work on credit 
rehabi li tation so that thei r futu re shopping op ti ons become beller. The idea of shopping, 
however, is not without it s short comings and can become com plicated particularl y in 
cases when networks of unethi ca l actors, including rea lto rs, arrange the fina ncing in 
behalf o f the borrowers. 
Financial educcuion in rile schools. As good as homebuyer education may be, the 
ex perts admined that it was onl y a temporary so lution to a much larger problem: a 
genera l lack of financial literacy among a ll Americans, including Utahns. One educator 
exclaimed: 
I think everyone should be required to have personal finance classes before they 
are out in the wor ld. It's bas ic educa ti on that all hi gh school seniors or j uniors 
should have. 
Several part ic ipants mentioned that beginn ing in 2007, all high schoo l students 
wi ll be req ui red to take one-half credit of financial education. While thi s is certa inl y a 
step in the right direction , it is only the beginning, according to one neutral participant , 
because financial education should be a core requirement, and in her opinion it is ··more 
import an t than algebra." When asked to clarify, th is parti cipant explained Lh at students 
arc required Lo know algebra in order to graduate, but are not required to know how to 
ba lance a checkbook, interpret a loan document, or understand credit. When asked to 
rate the impo rtance of fi nancial education this expert repl ied: 
A ten in my opinion on a scale of one to ten. Everybody has to go get a job, 
everybody is going to have credit o f ome kind somewhere or another down the 
road. Everybody is go ing to have to pay for things, get money and pay for things. 
Ba lancing a checkbook is a simple thing bu t I got to tell you there's a lo t of 
people who don ' t have a c lue how to do it. I do n't know how you manage in life 
without having some financial literacy. 1ow Algebra I wo uld say one in ten 
might usc it once they get out ofsehoo l, but rea l life fin ances, everybody." 
Consequences o f Unfair Lending 
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Determining the consequences of predatory (unfair) lending was not ori ginall y an 
objective ol't hi s study and was therefore not included as a question during the interviews. 
Nevertheless, participants saw lit to add a great dea l ofinfom1ation concern ing thi s topic. 
The fact that participants were able to adequately address an additional topic that was not 
ex plicitly so licited serves as an additional verificat ion of the validity of thi s study for 
describ ing predatory lendi ng issues. In other wo rds, it is probable that had other 
objectives been overlooked such as determining victim characteri sti cs or suggesti ons for 
reducti on, these topics would have been di scussed by the intervi ewees an yway. This 
sec tion covers the material shared by part icipants concerning the consequences of unfair 
lendi ng. 
The consequences of unfair lend ing can be numerous and far reaching. The 
industry itse lf is hurt by its own actors. First , an indust ry advocate stated that , 
"Consumers are less comfortable meeting with th ei r loan officers," and also that, 
"They' re intimidated by the process." The whole industry suffers because of the acti ons 
of a few. When approached about thi s topic one lender illustrated: 
Tha t's why laws are made. That 's why there are laws about bank robbery. The 
average person doesn' t commit bank robbery but there 's the law fo rbidding bank 
robbery because there are a few people who go out and do it. And it 's the same 
thing with our mortgage laws. If everybody wou ld just be straight up, and look 
out for the best interest of the customer, the borrower, we wouldn ' t have so many 
regulations. 
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Industry actors are not the on ly ones who suffer losses; everyday investors in 
mutual fu nds, life insurance policies, retirement funds and other investments also bear 
some of the losses. One 20-year veteran of the market clarified: 
So, if fraud is committed on a loan, and that loan is so ld to an in vestor, and 
because of the fraud, at some point , that loan defaults, then it 's that end investor 
that potentia ll y takes the huge hit s. I mean, and those hits can be substantial. 
Fo reclosures and bankru ptc ies are quite freq uent consequences as a publi c affairs 
pccialist related, 'The consequences are numerous and far reachi ng. Foreclosures and 
bankruptcies are the most common consequences." Borrowers arc not the onl y ones who 
su ffcr losses from foreclosure and bankruptcy; neighbori ng propert y va lues can be 
affected, and tax payers, as usua l share some of the costs. A form er banker explained: 
There are other economic impacts whi ch have a rippl e effect. They take away 
time from other deve lopment s, take up staff time, sheriffs sa les, bankruptcy 
proceedings cost staff time and tax payers dollars. 
This parti cipant cont inued to expound that the ripple e ffect described above 
event uall y has an effec t on the overall economy. The home buying market is vast and 
innuential , and problems in that area can play a large role in the rest of the economy. 
Unsurprisi ngly much of the costs of unfair lending practices arc passed ri ght back 
to the bOITOwers in numerous ways, such as hi gher priced lend ing products, including 
higher interes t rat es and fees. Yet, as bad as a ll of these consequences may be. they pale 
in comparison to the consequences tha t face the victims. A lender expl ained why the 
conseq uences can be so ruinous: 
There's probabl y a lot of people that may have had predatory abuses in buying 
groceries, or cars, or furniture, but it's not life changing like it can be on a 
mortgage, because that has a substantial financ ial effect on peop le .... And I 
think that ' s why mortgage lend ing gets so much attent ion. 
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Summary 
Twelve profess ionals fro m the mortgage lending market in Utah, included four 
consumer advocates, four industry advoca tes and four neutral parti c ipan ts, were asked to 
delinc and describe predatory mortgage lending. Each subsequent summar·i zedlind ing 
discussed is directl y support ed by comments made by the participants. 
Definition 
Predatory lending is the act of prey ing on or taking ad vantage o f borrower 
vulnerabilities. Whi le there arc subt le differences between the terms predatory, abusive 
and fraudulent lending, participants frequently used these terms interchangeab ly. Thi s 
impli es that partic ipants used the term predatory lending not onl y fo r di scuss ing targeted 
acts or preying on vulnerabiliti es, but as an encompassing term fo r all lending abuses, 
including ill egal actions. Similarl y, the term '·predatory lender" was not always used to 
refer to an actual lender but included any mortgage market actor such as an appraiser, a 
real estate agent , a servicer, or anyone who earns prolits in the mortgage lending market. 
Predatory lending as a vocabulary term in the mortgage market is frequently 
mi sunderstood because it regularl y carri es cert ain stigmas and sli ghtly diffe rent meanings 
and connotati ons depending on the perceptions of the user of the term . The imp lica ti on is 
that the term "predatory lending" is actuall y an obstacle to common understand ing, and 
should therefore be di scarded and replaced with another, more suitable term, that aids 
common understand ing instead o f becoming a hindrance. 
While the participants did not ex pl icit ly suggest a rep lacement term, the less 
stigmati ted and more encompass ing phrase of ' 'unfair lending" was used on severa l 
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occasions by partic ipants to refe r to predatory, abusive and fraud ulent acts. Therefore. 
this \las the substi tu te term used throughout the remainder of th is paper. Simi larl y, the 
term "actor' ' or "bad acto r" was used in place of the term " lender," to include all poss ible 
perpetrators of un fair lending. 
Us ing ev idence quoted by participants it was determine that unfl1ir lending is one 
or more of the following: (a) a transaction without a fidu ciary duty or having the 
borrower's best interest in mind, (b) a transac tion the borrower does not completely 
understand for any reason includ ing age, language barrier or lack of financial savvy, 
(c) a transac tion that has no beneficial use or results in ha1111 to the borrower, (d) a loan 
that deli vers the lender excess ive profits, and (e) a loan that the borrower does not have 
the ab ility to repay. 
Because thi s definition lacks measurab ilit y, it was supplemented by further 
ev idence offe red by the experts in thi s study. Six additional topics were di scussed by the 
part icipants and helped to furth er defi ne and desc ribe unfair mortgage lending. 
Mag11 iwde 
Unfair lending prac ti ces have been known to occur in many places throughout the 
state, but have been specifica ll y iden tifi ed in St. George, the west side of Sa lt Lake 
Va ll ey, West Va lley City, Ogden, and Sandy, and the entire Wasatch Front. Nine of the 
I 2 participams fe ll that unfair lending is a large and increasing problem in Utah. Many 
of t he participants considered forec losure, bankruptcy, and default rates as additional 
ind icators of unfai r lending prac tices, and because Utah has hi gh rates in all of these areas 
it can be concl uded that unfair lending is also very widesp read. 
l'iclim Cllllrac/erislics 
The victims of unfair lending practi ces are usual ly, but not always borrowers. 
Lenders and investors can also be victims, and occas ionall y even a co-conspirator in a 
fraudul ent loan can become a secondary victim. Borrowers usuall y suffer much more 
severe losses than other types of victims, and justifi ab ly received more attention of the 
participants. 
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Characteri stics of vulnerable borrowers were separated into four areas: personal 
attributes, emotional characteristi cs, financial characteristics, and general ability to 
understa nd home loan transacti ons. Common personal anributes of victi ms were yo ung, 
elderly, minorit y, non-English speaking, overly-trusting, somewhat irresponsible, and 
could potenti all y be anyone. Emotional characteri stics of victims included fee lings of 
cl cspcrn lion, des ire for instant grali fication , and real or perceived pressures from peers 
and lenders to go through with loans. Financia l characterist ics included a bad credit 
hi sto ry, an instan t credit mental it y, low income, no savi ngs, large amo unts o f equity in a 
home, and poor financial literacy sk ill s. Utah borrowers also general ly lack the 
understanding, experience and education needed to undertake the complexi ti es in volved 
in a home loan transac ti on. 
rac/Ors 
There were four genera l categori es fo r the facto rs and cond itions that fostered the 
ex istence of unfair lend ing in Utah: industry, public, legal, and overl app ing factors. 
Industry fac tors included market complex ity, high levels of market activi ty, the 
prevalence of bad actors, and a system that promotes conflicting incenti ves. Facto rs 
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affecting the pub li c as potent ial borrowers included a language barri er, instant cred it 
mentality, lack of community reso urces, pressure for homeownership, a trusting nature, 
lack of education , lack of education opportuni ti es and consumer awareness, and high 
forec losu re and defau lt rates with co rresponding negati ve effects on credit. Though 
participan ts were di vided on whether Utah 's legal system was too relaxed or too 
restrictive, the majority agreed that jurisdictional issues created a major prob lem in 
addressi ng unfair lending, and that enforcement and effecti veness of penalties could also 
be improved. Addit ional facto rs that innuenced all areas include a lack or acco un tabi li ty 
on al l s ides of mortgage transac tions, obstac les for redress for victims, scarce resources 
for effecti ve education and prosecution, pressure to deli ver a transaction and the lack of a 
common understanding o f what unfa ir lending ent ai ls. 
Practices 
The common practi ces that are in vo lved in unfair lend ing were divided between 
un fa ir ac ti ons, and unfair loan features. Unfai r ac ti ons included I 00% financing, the 3-
yea r cyc le of employment , bait and switch, canni ba li sm or minorities abus ing minori ties, 
criminal conduct, equity based lending, mi sleading information , scheme to stea l, multiple 
sa lary qualification, nipping, abusive servicing, steering, unaffordable lending, preying 
on vulnerabi liti es, abusive networking, and over-appraisi ng. Unfair loan features 
included adj ustable rate mortgages, teaser rates, balloon payments, cred it insurance, 
finances fees, hidden charges, high fees, high interest rates, interest onl y loans, and 
prepayment penalties. 
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Ret!ucrio11 
Methods or ideas for reducing unfair lend ing in Utah were contrib uted free ly by 
participants, most of which referenced a change to one or more of the factors, practi ces or 
characteri sti cs previously menti oned. 
Legislation. Actor acco untab il ity shou ld be increased thro ugh further licensing 
and con tinuing education. Steps the state has already taken to li cense and to requi re 
Principle Lending Managers, were pos iti ve moves. Penalties need to be more severe, in 
order to be an adeq uate deterrent. Tracking of the geographical paltern o f areas wi th fast 
growth and hi gh number of closi ngs would be producti ve. Effec ti veness and awareness 
of systems of legal red ress for consumers needs vas t improvement. Mandato ry education 
fo r borrowers before entering a loan transac tion was encouraged. Juri sdi cti onal gaps 
between the Division of Real Es tate, Department of Financial Institutions, and other 
regu latory bod ies invo lved in home-based lend ing, need to be addressed. This issue 
needs to eventua ll y be addressed at the fede ral level, because state laws have no 
jurisdicti on over national fi nancia l en ti ties. 
Collll/lllllity Support. Community support is needed in grea ter abundance. 
Consumer support could possib le come in the form of consumer advocacy groups, 
neighborhood rev ita lization programs, or fundin g. 
111centives. The industry needs to make more efforts to ensure customer 
sa ti sfaction and long term relat ions th ro ugh estab lishing an effecti ve hot line fo r consumer 
feedback, accountabil ity and industry imposed penalt ies on bad ac tors, and stronger 
lender-c lien t relationships. Borrowers also need an incentive for getting themselves 
ed ucated and aware of poten ti al dangers in the mortgage lendi ng market. 
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Financial education. Education is paramount, and cannot be overemphas ized. 
Homcbuyer education is an effecti ve source for borrower education, but classes are not 
ab le to reach the hundreds of thousands of borrowers who need it. Funding for these 
classes and lor ad verti sing is needed, particul arl y from the industry it se lf because 
indust ry actors also stand to benefit from hav ing mortgage ready borrowers. Timing of 
homcbuyer education needs to be addressed, because once the consumer has al ready 
en tered the buying process it is usua lly too late. Awareness needs to be increased, not 
on ly ofhom ebuye r classes, but also of the va lue of the education as a protec ti on from 
poten tia l dangers they can encounter in the mo rtgage lending market. Consumers also 
need to be taught how to shop effec ti ve ly for a good deal in the mortgage lending market, 
and need to learn how to properl y rehab ilitate and maintain good cred it hi stori es. 
In spite orallthe benefits of homebuycr education , it is merely a temporary 
so lution to a much bigger prob lem, the lack of financia l li teracy among Utah ns and 
Americans in general. Sound financia l education is a long neglected, yet vitall y needed 
subject, and is fa r more important than even algebra and other basic courses because 
c,·eryonc wi ll use it. It is apparent that society in general is paying for thei r lack of 
finan cial preparation through epidemics of vict imi zed consumers in every market , not 
just the home buying market. Utah has made steps to include a half of a cred it of 
financial education in the high schools, but this is on ly a small step in the right directi on. 
Elementary schools, junior high schools, co lleges, and communit ies need to offer more 
classes, and consumers need to be made aware o f their importance. 
Conce rning ideas for reduction ofunlitir lend ing one neutra l participant 
summari zed: 
9 1 
Well , there 's two ways you can come at th is, thi s way, where people have a full 
array o f opport unities and opt ions for them, and are educated as to how to make 
correct choices. The other, which some states advocate and some consumer 
groups advocate is you just say, "No we are go ing to dec ide for you what loans 
you can make. We are go ing to take the judgment away from yo u and were go ing 
to limit lending to just thi s very narrow area, and prescribe all the terms and that 's 
where credit wi ll res ide, and it won' t be avai labl e any where else. And I think 
that's a lousy way to approac h thi s .... I think thi s educati on should be in the 
seco ndary schoo ls. It should be a manda tory high school co urse. 
Consequences of Unfair Leudiug 
The consequences of unfai r lending can be numerous and fa r reach in g. The 
industry, and investo rs bear some of the losses of unfa ir loans. Much of these costs arc 
actua ll y passed ri ght back to the consumers in the form higher prices on loan produc ts, 
though forec losures and bankruptcies can have a ripple effec t through the entire 
economy. Of course, the consequences to the indi vidual borrower arc often much worse 
and much more devastating. Victims often ex peri ence default, foreclosure and 
bankruptcy as a result of unfair loans. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSS IO 
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This chapter will hi ghli ght the key findings of the data and discuss the similariti es 
and differences of these findings and current lit erature on the subj ect. Implica tions of the 
key lindings wi ll then be di scussed fo llowed by the limitations of this tudy. Finall y, 
suggest ions for fut ure research wi ll be offered. 
Key Find ings 
The in ten t of thi s section is not to directl y compare every finding from the data to 
those in the literature, but rather to di scuss the key findings of the data and how they 
contradi ct or support findin gs in current lit erature. Add itionally, because data were 
specific to Utah and most cu rrent literat ure is nat ionall y representative, differences in 
data and li terature do not necessa ril y imply contradictions, but may simp ly represent 
differences in geograp hica l loca tion. 
Definition 
Participants expl icitly defi ned predatory mo rtgage lending as targeted practices 
that intentional ly ex plo it the vu lnerabi liti es of borrowers. Impl icitl y, or in common use, 
participan ts used predatory mo rt gage lending to refer to a much wider range of practi ces 
including all instances of mortgage lending abuse and fraud . This inconsistency between 
defin it ion and common use suggest that the term predatory lending is misunderstood, or 
rat her lacks a common understanding. Its meani ng is often assoc iated with the 
percept ions of those who usc it, and can someti mes carry negative connotations, attack ing 
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implica ti ons, or sti gma. The conclusion is that the term predatory lending serves as more 
of an obstacle to common understand ing, than as a too l and shou ld therefore be replaced 
with another, more encompass ing, and less sti gmat ized term. 
The term unfair lending was used throughout the remainder o f the study to refer to 
all instances of predatory, ab usive, fra udulent and harmful lending, though thi s term is 
not a defi nit ive replacement. Unfair lending as de fined by parti cipants is one or more of 
the fo llowing: (a) a transaction without a fiduciary duty or having the borrower's best 
interes t in mind, (b) a transaction the borrower does not completely understand for any 
reason including age, language barrier or lack of financi al savvy, (c) any transacti on that 
has no benefi cia l use or resu lt s in harm to the borrower, (d) any loan that deli vers the 
lender excess ive profits, and (e) any loan th at the borrower does not have the abilit y to 
repay. Thi s de finiti on is not overtly measurable; therefore, the subsequent sections 
convey more detailed information offered by participants that is more eas il y measured. 
None o f the relevant lit eratu re to thi s point has suggested that the term predatory 
lending itse lf was an obstac le to achiev ing common understanding. This is indeed a new 
and unforeseen result that could ultimately prove to be very useful in the goa l to reach 
common understanding. Add itiona ll y, onl y a few studies have attempted to define 
predatory/unfa ir lending, and when compared to the detail and clarit y of the definiti on 
deri ved in thi s stud y, they certa inly appear to be lacki ng (Engel & McCoy, 2002; U.S. 
Department of Housing, 2000). 
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Mag11it 11de ojPredatorv Le11di11g ill Uta II 
Participants suggcstedthatthe magn itude or ex tent of unfair lending in Utah is 
direc tl y indi cated by the default, fo rec losure, and bankruptcy rates in the state. Because 
Utah has rank ed in the top ten in each of th ese ca tegories over the last several years, thi s 
suggests that un fair lending in Utah is widespread and rampant (AB I, 2004; Federal 
Bureau of Invest igation, 2005; Mi tche ll , 2003). However, when a ked directl y 
respondent comments were mi xed, wi th some saying that unfai r lend ing was prevalen t 
and others saying that it was not. 
Victim Cilaracteristics 
Borrowers are not the onl y victims of unfair lending. Investors, the industry 
itse lf, and sometimes even co-conspirators in fraud atlempts can become victimized to a 
degree. In the literat ure, borrowers are nearly always seen as the sole victims in un fai r 
lending (Cal em et al. , 2004; Engel & McCoy, 2002; Lord , 2005; Zimmerman et al. , 
2002). It is true, however, that the other vic tims do not suffe r the same direct and 
staggering losses that bo rrowers ofien face, and therefore j ustifi ab ly, the literature and 
most of the comments of part icipants were centered on borrowers as the victi ms. 
Simi lar to reports in literature, borrowers are more vulnerab le due to certain 
personal and financial attributes, such as being elderl y, minorit y, low- income or bad 
credit (Newman & Wyly, 2002; Zimmerman et al., 2002). Unlike the li teratu re, 
parti cipants also explained that borrowers are genera lly unprepared menta ll y and 
emotionall y to enter home loan transacti ons. They are often emot ionally unsteady 
because of the magnitude of the transaction , and the thril l of instant gratifi cation th rough 
95 
cred it. Additi ona ll y, home loan transac ti ons o ft en coi ncide with major life changes such 
as a marriage, new job, and a change in fr iends and neighbors, and others that can 
emotionally impair a borrower's judgment. Along with nuctuat ing emotions, borrowers 
are frequently unprepared mentall y to enter· a home loan transac ti on. The complex iti es 
involved in a transaction, particularl y in disc losures and other paper work, requi re a ll but 
the most dedicated and in formed to place trust in the loan officer or broker, which 
unfortunately leaves them open to possibi lities of ab use. 
Factors That Foster Predato1y Leudiug 
Literature often focuses on the unethica l and irresponsible market ac tors that are 
the perpetrators in cases of unfair lending (Engel &McCoy, 2002). Whi le partic ipants 
ce rt ainl y agr·ee, they also indica ted that irresponsibi lit y and lack of accountabili ty persists 
on both sides of a transaction. Just as market actors are too wil ling to forsake thei r ethics 
to make quick profi ts, borrowers are too will ing to trust thei r fin ancial futures to some 
other party than themselves. Participants related that unethica l market acto rs are 
currentl y difficult to hold accoun tab le for unfair practices, and even those who are held 
liable face lenient penalti es th at do not act as sufficient deterrents of future act ions by 
them or others. According to parti ci pants, borrowers themselves also frequently try to 
avo id accountab ility. Parti cipants exp lained that most "unfair," "predatory," or "abusive" 
acts that occu r to victims are actuall y fully disclosed in the paper work of the transaction 
and borrowers simply fa il to read them, or fail to seek help if the materi al is over thei r 
heads, but instead leave the respons ibility of ensuring fair transactions to the broker or 
lender. 
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The mortgage lending market is complex and vast, and nearl y all parti es invo lved 
in a mortgage transac ti on, at one point or another, face conflicting incenti ves (Kim-Sung 
& Hermanson, 2003 , U.S. Department of Housing 2000). According to parti cipants these 
confli cting incentives often result in a tradeoff of long term we ll being for more 
immediate, short term benefit s. In other words, both borrowers and lenders ha ve 
incentives to forsake the long-tcrrn stability of loans for more immed iate benefit s such as 
higher commissions, or large stuns of instant credit. While parti cipants lament that 
market structure, legal j uri sdi ctions, and avenues of vict im redress, are complex and full 
of contradicting incenti ves, they suggest that cooperati on is sti ll possible. While 
literature does address each o f these issues to some ex tent, they are not emphas ized as 
they were by participants (Engel & McCoy, 2002; Lord, 2005 ; Sturdevant & Brennan, 
1999). 
Practices 
According to literature, unfai r loans arc the result of harmfu l acts or practi ces 
(S turdevant & Brennan, 1999). What the literature does not full y explai n is that loan 
features are not in and of themselves unfair, predatory, or abusive, but rather become 
unfair onl y when misused. The failure to make, or adequately emphas ize thi s distincti on 
has led man y aggress ive state legis latures to ban certain lending features (Lord, 2005; 
Quercia et a l., 2003). Aggress ive banning, or prohibitive legislat ion has had adverse 
consequences in some states, including a lack of competition among lenders and 
consequently, a lack of lending op ti ons for borrowers (Downey & Barr, 2006). Overl y 
strict leg islation would have the same effect that usury rate restri ctions had in the earl y 
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1980' s, which si mul ta neously hampered the lending business, and li mited the opt ions of 
borrowers, resulti ng in pri me imerest rates th at were nea rl y quadru ple the current 2006 
rate. Parti ci pants have emphas ized that instead of reverting to pre-1 980's cond itions, 
leg islati on should protec t consumers while all ow ing legitimate business to nou ri sh, and 
that there are leg itimate uses for many loan features as long as they are used under the 
right circum stances. The spec i fi e act ions and loan fea tures that part icipa lll s sa id they 
have seen in Utah, are not much di fferent fmm those in the li teratu re (Engel & McCoy, 
2002 ; Sturdevant & Brennan). 
Reduction of Pred({[on • Mortgage Lending 
The literature cert ainl y suggested leg islati on as a solu tion to un fa ir mort gage 
lending, however, most suggesti ons alluded to prohibiti ve legislati on, or the banning of 
speci fi e loan features that are used to abuse borrowers (Engel & McCoy, 2002; Quercia 
et al. , 2004). Participants of thi s study generall y supported a more free ma rket appmach 
where market actors and borrowers are more accountable for their own actions, but stil l 
able to make the ir own dec isions. The reasons for thi s feeli ng, di scussed prev iously, 
were that it a ll ows more opt ions to the consumer, and allows legiti mate business to 
prosper. The key to thi s approach is to reduce ex isting information asymm etries, or to 
insure perfec t information and full accountab ility on both sides of the transaction. 
Licensing, increased penalt ies, more efficient vic ti m redress, manda tory borrower 
education, and bridging j urisdi ctional boundari es were seen as methods of reduction that 
were foc used more on accountability and responsib ili ty. 
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Similar to research fi ndings elsewhere, participants suggested increased 
coopera ti on between non-profit educators and financial institutions (U.S. Department on 
Housing, 2000). However, parti cipants elaborated that the industry needs incent ives to 
loc us more on long term customer relations and we ll -bei ng. The findin gs of the present 
study add to ex ist ing literat ure wi th suggest ions of consumer advocacy groups and 
neighborhood rev itali zation commillccs as ways to increase borrower awareness and 
responsi bil ity. 
Much o f the literature suggests some so rt of education for borrowers, but these 
suggestions are nearl y always secondary to suggest ions for increased legislat ion (Engel & 
McCoy; Lo rd, 2005). Participants in thi s study emphasized that the primary method of 
reducing the occu rrence of unfair lending is th rough education , and while certain ly 
important, legislation is onl y secondary. This is consistent with the parti cipants' views o r 
a genera l free market allitudc. 
Homcbuyer educa ti on courses are encou raged by participants as a short term 
remedy, as similarly echoed in the literaiUre (Lord , 2005). However, the long term 
so lution accordi ng to the participants is regular and frequent financial education courses 
in the secondary school s, co lleges, and communities, something that is bare ly di scussed 
in lit erature (Engel & McCoy, 2002). 
Consequences of Predarory Lending 
The industry and investors often bear some losses caused by unfai r lending, but 
the large losses are incurred by individual borrowers. Their financial futures can be 
u11crl y des troyed by un fa ir lend ing practices. As victi m tallies ri se, the more and more 
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their losses are felt in the rest of the economy because high forec losure and bankruptcy 
rates increase the cost of credit , and facilitate the usc tax payer do llars that could 
otherw ise be saved . The literatu re alludes to similar cost analyses, though not 
spec ifi cal ly for Utah (Stein, 200 1). 
Implicati ons 
A ke y imp li cation of thi s study is that the term predatory lending should be 
replaced with a more encompassi ng, and less sti gmati zed term. At the very least, it 
should be understood by all parti es invo lved that predatory lendi ng can refer to all 
instances of unfair lending and not onl y those that are targeted, and that the perpetrator 
can be any mortgage actor not just a lender. Thi s stud y used the term "unfair lending," 
and "actor" in the place of''predatory lending" and " lender" to emphasize the need for 
these changes. However, there is not conclusive ev idence that these terms are the most 
suitable replacements because the top ic o f replacement terms was not addressed in thi s 
research. 
Given the wea lth of new data suggested by the participants in thi s stud y, there are 
numerous impl ications for multipl e parti es in the stat e. These are di scussed nex t, though 
participants have related that any effec ti ve so lu tion to unfair lending will be multifaceted, 
and require the cooperation and long term commitment of all part ies discussed below. 
Consumer Educmion 
IJOJTo•vers. A key findi ng of thi s st ud y is that consumers need to be full y 
responsible for ensuring benefi cial transac tions, because they cannot rely on the market 
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ac tors to do th is for them. Undoubtedl y the so lution to unfair lending is mullifaceted and 
requires legislation, and industry correc ti ons, but hundreds of thousands of examples of 
unfai r lending have proven that the market can be treacherous and that the borrower 
cannot trust hi s financia l future to anyone but himsc l f. 
Th is is not to imply that each borrower needs to become an ex pert in the mortgage 
lend ing market, but it does mean that the borrower should be aware of unfair lending to 
the point that he knows of helpful resources, and places to go with spec ific questions on a 
loan. An addit ional possib il it y is the requirement o f a third party attorney or mortgage 
lending pro fess ional, with incenti ves to act completely in the best interest of the 
borrower, to review mortgage documents, and ensure borrower understanding before 
signin g. Thi s wo uld certainl y add to the monetary cost of closing, but given the rampant 
amoun ts of abuse currentl y present in the market, thi s wo uld likely reduce the rea l total 
costs of borrowing to consumers. Armed with full informat ion and educated allies, 
borrowers have the potential to change the saying from "caveat emptor" (let the buyer 
beware) to "caveat venditor" (let the se ll er beware). 
Consumer educators. Consumer educators need to continue doing what they do 
best: educate. The value of these services has been grea tl y underemphasized in the pas t 
and too oft en taken for gran ted. The participants of this study have placed a great dea l of 
trust and responsibility in the hands of these educators. Additional sources of funding 
need to be so ught out particularly from the lenders themselves who stand to ga in from 
hav ing mortgage-ready borrowers, and add itional quali lied educa tors are certainly needed 
throughout the state. 
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Consumer advoccues. The duty of consumer advocates is to support the 
multifaceted so lution. This entails ex tensive lobbying of the legislature for changes in 
the financ ial education opportunities in the schools and communities, and of funding for 
such programs. It also includes lobbying for changes in the code to increase penalti es or 
perpetrators. for requiring mandatory education for borrowers, and for regulations that 
can bridge the jurisdictional gaps in the regulato ry bodies of the state and nation. It also 
incl udes community support and community action groups, as well as good industry 
relat ions. 
Potier Implications 
lndusuy. The industry as a whole needs to understand that it also suffers from the 
hands of a few o f its own acto rs. For its own good the industry should lake a good hard 
look at the structure of incentives of it s actors and do what it can to ensure that these 
actors will pu rsue the long-term stabi lity of their loan products. Everyone wins when the 
transac ti on is fa ir and effi cient. The ind ustry should also vo luntaril y offer financial 
support to fund financial ed uca ti on courses for both chi ldren and adults. 
Legislators and regulators. A key goa l of further legi slation is to increase 
accou ntabilit y, and not to prohibit specific loan features. This can be done through 
effi cient li cens ing, increased penalties, and mandatory borrower ed ucation. 
It is essential that jurisdictional boundaries be bridged at the national level. As 
the current structure of mortgage regulation operates, states have very li tt le power in 
assuring th at all elements of the mortgage market are e ffect ively monito red, such as 
second mortgages, or home improvement loans. For example, finan cial institutions that 
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arc not based in Utah are not subjec t to the laws governing Utah. Instead they arc held 
acco un table by the state where the companies headquarters are located, which may be a 
much more lenient state, as far as mortgage regulations go. States, there fore, have 
mi spl aced incenti ves to allow more leni ent legislati on in order to draw the headqua rters 
of larger businesses to the state, which ultimately increases state revenue through taxes. 
The residents of the state wi ll likely suffer from un fa ir lending pract ices, but not 
signifi cantly more than if the headquarters were located in another state, and the company 
conti nued to operate in the state by simply bypass ing their laws. This is a very similar 
scenario to the exporting of interest rates of credit card companies located in South 
Dakota and Delaware. Some of the bigger, more widely dispersed fi nancia l institutions 
arc able to entirely escape state j uri sdi cti on all together, and are onl y monitored by 
fede ral regul ators, who lack suffici ent resottrces to c iTecti ve ly monitor mortgage lending 
ac ross the enti re nation. 
Aven ues for victim redress arc also severely inadequate. A cruc ial role of the 
governmen t is to provide support to it s c it izens act as an advocate on behalf of it s ci ti zens 
who are otherwise powerless. The imp lementation of an ombudsman o ffi ce that works 
on behalf of consumers is a poss ibi lit y. It is likely, however, that the issue of victim 
redress cannot be full y addressed unti I juri sdictional issues are sort ed ou t. 
An appropriate ro le for the governmen t in a free market economy such as 
support ed by the participants, is to ensure perfect information on bot h sides o f a 
transac ti on. A crucial element in the effic iency o f mortgage transacti ons is a financ iall y 
ed ucated consumer, however, current borrowers face ex treme defi ci ts of the necessary 
info rmati on needed to ensure fa ir transact ions. It is, therefore, the governm ent's 
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responsibi lity to ensure financ ialli te r~cy of its ci ti zens. This is something that sta te 
legis latu res can immed iately pursue, as opposed to waiting for juri sdictional issues to be 
working ou t. 
The legislature needs to appropriate more fund ing and direc t involvement in the 
administration of financial ed ucati on. The duty of finan cial education can no longer be 
the so le responsibility of non-profi t organizations but should be the duty of the state and 
fede ral governments due to the urgent and importalll nature of thi s need. Funding of such 
ed uca ti on programs should come at least partially fro m the lenders themselves, because 
they arc primary benefi ciaries of fa ir transacti ons. 
Scltoo/ hoards. Over the last 20 yea rs, legislators have all owed the introduct ion 
of a more open economy by reducing usury rat es and li mitations on who can become 
lenders. The tremendous fin ancial cri ses that are currently abound in the financi al 
markets ac ross the United States have come about because the legislature failed to 
simu ltaneous ly provide avenues for financial literacy education of Ameri can c it izens. 
Without fina ncial educat ion consumers are e ffec ti ve ly unarmed in a free market, and 
cannot functi on opt imally because they lack information and understanding needed to 
make ad va ntageo us buying decisions. Participants have em phasized that financi al 
ed ucation is essential for surviva l in tocla y's credit based society, and is something that 
everyo ne wil l use almost every cl ay of their lives. When put into perspec ti ve, financial 
education is indeed "more important than algebra." 
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Limitation s of the Study 
As in all qualitative studies, it cannot be assumed that the opi nions of these twelve 
parti cipan ts necessarily represen t the opinions of the entire lending com munity of Utah 
because they do not constitute a representative samp le of the popula tion or· the industry. 
However, the purpose of th is study was to defin e and describe preda tory lending through 
the eyes of a handful of everyday wi tnesses. In other words, thi s is an exploratory study 
to be bu ilt upon, and is not a conclusive study of mortgage lending practices. 
Chai n, or snowball sampling, was used in this study, wh ich may have introd uced 
cert ain biases of the resea rchers, who made the initial sampling decision , and of 
parti ci pants who made the additional referrals. In addition, the assignment of participants 
to the ca tego ri es of consumer advocate, industry advocate, and neut ra l pa rti cipant was 
made mostl y on the basis of how part icipants identified themselves. How well these 
perceptions would match those of others is unknown. However, the study's va lidity and 
reliability were strengthened using pilot interv iews, continuing feedback from 
partici pants on research questions, member checks on interview content to ensure 
accurate meaning, and the use o f assistant researchers to verify data cod ing and research 
des ign. 
It is appropriate in qualitati ve wo rk s such as thi s to present a bri ef" descript ion of 
my potent ia l biases as the primary researc her and fac il itato r in thi s research. It should be 
obvious that as a student of consumer sc iences I have a natural tendency to side wi th the 
consumer, and I consider myself to be an acti ve consumer advocate. In addition to thi s 
training as a consumer scien ti st, I also have a background in genera l economic theory. I 
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feel thi s unique combination of training has given me a somewhat objecti ve view of th is 
issue. and I can tru thfull y say that I have made every attempt to exam ine the issue of 
unfair (predatory) lending from all perspecti ves. 
I understand as one participan t put it , that "'businesses have to make money, they 
arc not philanthropic. They arc in business to make money that 's why they are ca lled 
businesses." I also understand that one assumption in economic theory is that both the 
buyer and the se ll er (o r borrower and lender in thi s case) have perfect or abso lu te 
infonnation and are dri ven by invisible market forces to make the most fair, or erfi cient 
exchange possible. However, the requirement of perfect information is oflen absent in 
the rea l world and ineffici ent transac tions occur every da y, as seen in the cases with 
unfair. or as I like to say, ineffi cient lending. 
Coming into thi s proj ec t I initi all y made the same assumptions as can be found in 
much of the literature on predatory lending: that the onl y way to riel the nation o f these 
inerfi cient transactions was through tough and un yield ing legislation. After many months 
of rev iewing relevant literatu re, and even through the final stages of thi s research project, 
I con tinued to fu ll y expect the results of thi s study to reach the same conclusion as the 
literature. During the data co ll ecti on phase of thi s study I began to recogni ze that the 
responses of my participants did not entirely support thi s view, and that legislation was 
not the on ly answer, and not even the primary answer. Near the fin al stages of data 
co ll ec ti on, I slow ly began to reali ze that my initi al assumptions were not in line wi th the 
res t of my economic training that teaches that if market ineffic iency is present it is either 
due to imperfect information or govern ment invo lvement' At thi s point it became 
apparen t to me that it was the form er, though government intervention around the country 
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has been increasing over the last six to seven years, wi th mixed results (Downey & Barr, 
2006). 
This is not to say that I bel ieve the govern ment shou ld play no ro le at al l in the 
issue of unfair lend ing, but I do see the logic of the conclusions of this research; namely, 
that litt le good can come through prohibition of spec ifi c practices or loan fea tures that are 
not in and of themselves predatory, because they are only predatory when they are 
misused. Doing so would be to simply revert to pre- 1986 lend ing market conditions, 
where the now or money was greatl y impeded. A more useful ro le fo r the government, 
in my opinion, and as participants of thi s st udy suggested, is to li cense, track, and 
pub lici ze the ac ti ons of the market, so that a ll borrowers and industry ac tors mi ght be 
"" '!IFe o f. the conseque nces of un fa ir lending. 
From the mid 1980s to the present , the government has continual ly introd uced 
more relaxed lending policies with the hope that American lend ing businesses can 
become more profitable. Theoretically there is nothing wrong with thi s so rt of open 
economic policy. However in practi ce, consumers suddenly have new freedo ms, bu t lack 
the sk ill s required to make responsible decisions. The government should have also 
ensured full financia l literacy of its citi zens before it ever decided to relax lendi ng 
standards. Tho ugh certainly pas t due, the government shou ld now step up to its role of 
ensuring fair markets, and ensure that each American citi zen has the opportunity to learn 
the sk ills necessary to make in fo rmed decisions in the marketplace. When info rmati on is 
he ld perfectly among all panics the onl y pos ible outcome is the most effic ient, or most 
fair transaction, in which the price o ffered by suppli ers meets the price demand by 
bu ye rs. 
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The battle for perfec t in fonnation or fu ll educat ion and awareness of al l parti es is 
certainl y not an easy one, but at thi s point il is much too soon to doubt its potentia l 
because it has onl y scarcely been used as a preventati ve too l. Most current borrowers do 
110 1 ha ve fin ancial educat ion, most have 1101 taken home buye r courses, and many of the 
borrowers currentl y entering the subprimc market are 110 1 prepared mentall y or 
financ iall y lor the long-term respons ibi lities of owning homes, and in my opinion should 
be di ssuaded from pursuing homeownershi p until they are ready. I believe that an 
ed ucated popu lation of borrowers wo uld seriously curtail mo rtgage lending abuses. In 
spite of the changing views I have had throughout thi s project ! am confiden t that the data 
present ed in chap ter four speaks for it self, and that had the data col lection and analys is 
been under the direct ion of another primary researcher that very similar conclusions 
would ha ve been reached. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
The groundwork has been estab li shed lor a thorough definit ion and desc rip tion of 
predatory lending in Utah has been set through thi s research. There are many additional 
research endeavors that can proceed from this stud y, such as a quantitati ve study that 
measures some of the fac tors, practi ces, and characteri sti cs desc ri bed in thi s research to 
determine their degree of influence on unfair lending. It co uld also be very use fu l to 
conduct a simi larl y designed qua li ta ti ve study to interview victims of predatory/unfair 
lending. Such a study would be use ful for identifying their responsiveness to certa in 
ed ucational ideas, and awareness issues, and fo r verifi cat ion of factors, prac ti ces and 
characteristi cs that led to their vict imizati on. On a broader scale, the area of financial 
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educati on is c rucial and a lso requires furthe r research . Issues of timin g of educati o n, 
qua li ty of ed ucation methods, and optima l quantities of education are all wo rth y resea rc h 
e nd eavors. 
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Appendi x A . Info rmed Consent Form 
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Date Crea ted August 29, 2005 
Utj h St;lk University IRB Approved 09/01 /2005 
Approval termina tes 08/3 1/200(> 
Protocol Number: ti 1346 
IIW l'assword Protected per Tr~~e M. l{ubal. IRB Administratm 
Informed Consent 
" l)efin ing Prcd:.1t ory Mortgage Lending in Ut:-1 h" 
Professor Lucy Delgad illo and graduate student Luke Erickson in the Department of Family 
Consumer and Human Development at Utah State University are conducting a resea rch study to help define 
Predatory Mortgage Lending in Utah You have been asked to participate because you work in the real 
esta te industry 
You wi ll be asked to sha re exper iences and opinions in a race-to-face interview tha t may last 20 
minutes or no more than 2 hours, depend ing on you r response to our questions. Your responses will be 
audio recorded and kept confidential unless you wish to be named in the fina l report of the researc h study. 
At that time, yo u wi ll need 10 sign an approval statement. After data collection, all notes and recordings 
wi ll be kept in a locked fil e cabinet in a locked ofrice until comple ti on of the resea rch projec t. The 
record ings and notes wil l be destroyed approximately 10 months afier the study is co mpleted. 
There me no d irect bene fits to participate in this study at thi s time; however, indirectly the home 
lending env ironment cou ld be improved increas ing the sat isfaction of borrowers and lenders as we ll as third 
part ies. There arc no anticipated risks involved in participa ting in this research. If you have any questions 
you may con tact ei ther Luke Erickson al (435) 797-3408 or Professor Delgadi llo al (435) 797-7204. 
Your partic ipation is volu nl<lry and you may withdraw at any time without conseq uence . Any 
in iOrmation obta ined wil l be destroyed should you decide to wi thdraw. The Institutiona l Rev iew Board 
(IRB) for the protection of part icipants in research at Utah State Univers ity has approved this study. If you 
have any quest ions or concerns about your rights you ma y ca ll them at (435) 797- 182 1. 
You ha ve been given two copies or the inrormed consent. Please sign both copies, keep one copy 
Cor yourself and return the second copy to the researc hers 
The research has been expla ined to the client by Luke Erickson or me and s/he understands the st udy, 
poss ib le ri sks and benefits, and that taking part in the slllcly is comp lete ly volu ntary. The client has had a 
ch<:Hlce to ask questions and they ha ve been answered. 
Professor Lucy Delgadillo Ph .D Date 
Dept. of Fami ly, Consumer & Human Dev. 
Utah State Univers ity 
2905 Old Main .H ill , Logan, UT 84322-2905 
Telephone: (435) 797-7204 
Fax (435) 797-3 845 
E-mai l lucy~llL!J::<c·Jb.!!,_s;Qu 
Luke Erickson 
Research Assis tan t 
( 435) 797-7204 
Date 
By signi ng my signature I agree to partic ipate: ---:::--,-,----c--=- --
Participant 's Signature Date 
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Appendi x B. Interview Questi ons 
11 8 
Biographica l Questions 
I . W hat is yo ur current tit le? 
2. How long have you been in thi s position? 
3. Co uld yo u bri e n y desc ri be any previous pos iti ons re lated to mort gage lendi ng'1 
4. How have your prev ious positions led to yo ur current position? 
5. What ki nd of contact do yo u have with others in the local and state mortgage markets? 
6. How wo uld you generally describe yo ur ex perience in the mortgage marke t in Utah? 
Main Resea rch Questio ns 
I . How wo uld yo u desc ri be or de fin e abusive mo rtgage lendin g? 
2. Wo ul d say that the term " predato ry lending" captures what yo u have just desc ribed, o r 
arc th e re di rre rcnces between th em·) 
3. Wha t do you feel is the magn itude or ex te nt of hi gh cost and abusive loans in Utah? 
4 . What are the major factors behind the ex is tence of hi gh cost and abusive home loans? 
5. What arc th e specific abusive practi ces you have seen in home loans? 
6. W hat are the common characterist ics of borrowers who end up with predatory and/o r 
ab usive loans? 
7. In yo ur opini o n, w hat co uld be done to reduce predatory mortgage lendin g in Utah? 
Other Questi ons 
Who e lse in s tat e wo uld you recommend I inte rview to get more informat io n o n 
predato ry mo rt gage lend ing? 
11 9 
Do yo u have thi s person's contact in fo rmation? 
Do yo u th ink the questi ons I asked yo u would be suffi cient for an interview wi th 
thi s person, or wo ul d you recommend changes? 
120 
Appendi x C. Cod ing Scheme of Results 
12 1 
Research Obj ecti ve One: A Definiti on 
Abusive Lending 
Predatory Lending 
Predatory Lending vs . Abusi ve Lending 
Fraudulent Lending 
Fraudulent vs . Abusive and Predatory Lending 
The Term "Predatory Lend ing" 
Unfair Lending 
Research Objective Two: The Magnitude o f Unfair 
Research Objecti ve Three: Vic tim Charac te ris ti cs 
The Co-co 11spirator 
N0 11 -horro1vers 
Borrowers 
Perso11al Allriluaes 
Emotional Chamcteristics 
of Borrowers 
Financial Characteristics 
of Borrowers 
General U11derstanding of 
the Mortgage Market 
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l Research Objective Four: Factors that Foster Unf'air Lendin g Practices 
H Industry Factors J '-----~--..-~______./ 
H 
H 
y 
Market Complexity J 
Booming Housing Market I 
The Market System I 
-{ Factors Related to the Genera l Public 
W Legal Factors ] L ____ ~_ ___) 
-{ Accountability 
-{ Jurisdictiona l Boundaries 
-{ Overlapping Factors I 
-{ Obstacles to Victim Redress 
~ Lack of Resources for Prevention and Reparation 
-{ Pressure to Arrange Bad Loans 
-{ Lack of Measurement Standards 
-{ Summary of Obj ec tive Four I 
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l 
I 
l 
l 
l 
3 Year Cyc le of Loan Offi ce r 
Employment 
Bait and Switch 
Lending Cannibalism 
Crim inal Conduct 
Eq uity Based Lending 
Mis lead ing In forma tion 
Scheme to Steal from 
Borro wers 
Multip le Sa lary Qualifica tion 
Flipping 
Abusive Servic ing 
Steering 
Unaffordable Lendi ng 
Preying on Vulnerabilities 
Abusive Networkin.g 
Over Appra isin.g 
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Adj ustab le Rate 
Mortgages 
Teaser Rate 
Balloon Payments 
Cred it Insurance 
Financed Fees 
H idclen Char><es 
Hi gh Fees 
Hi gh In terest Rates 
In terest On ly Loans 
Prepayment Pena lti es 
r Research Objective Six: Suggestions for J l Reduction of Predatory Lending 
r1L_ _______ L_e~g~i sll~at~io='=, =======~J ______________ __, 
H Prohibitive Legislation Not Effective I 
H Increase Accountability I 
H Geographical Tracking 1 
H Improve Victim Redress Systems I 
L{ Mandatory Ed ucation for Borrowers I 
-{ Bridge Juri sdictional Boundaries ] 
r1L_ ____ C_o_n_,_n,_'_' n,i~ty_S __ u~pp~o_r_t ____ JI 
,--------------------, -{~====F=a=i'=·=H=o=u=s=in=g=C==o=n=,'=n=it=t e=e=s====~l 
{ 
Neighborhood Revitalization J 
Programs 
~-------
,--------------------, 
-{
Change Industry and BorrowerJ 
Incen ti ves 
r1L_ __ ~R~c~a~r~ra~n~~~e~l n~d~'~'s~t,~·v_l~n~c~e~n~ti~v~e~s __ _JI 
U Rearrange Borrower Incenti ves I [ '------- ----' 
,--------------------, 
--{ Financial Ed ucation I 
-{ Homebuver Educat ion I 
-{ Awareness I 
-{ Resources l 
~ Shopping l 
-{ Financial Education in the Schools ) 
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